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Weaver: Weaver: Some Realism about Chevron

Some Realism About Chevron
Russell L. Weaver*
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,' is

widely regarded as a "landmark" administrative law decision.2 One commentator claimed that it produced "a revolution in administrative law"3 and is4
"one of the most important administrative law decisions in recent memory."
A second commentator declared that it dominates "the law governing judicial
acceptance of agencies' interpretations," 5 while a third described it as "the
leading case on the subject ... of deference to aFencies on statutory issues."6
These evaluations are certainly supportable. In the first three and a half
years after it was decided, Chevron was cited more than 600 times.' It has
now been cited more than 2,500 times. Moreover, Chevron altered the
rhetoric of judicial decisionmaking. Prior to Chevron, the Supreme Court
generally refused to "defer" to an agency's interpretation of a statute in the
sense that it treated that interpretation as "controlling."9 In most cases, the
Court would make an independent interpretive decision." If the responsible

* Herff Distinguished Visiting Professor, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, Memphis
State University, & Professor of Law, University of Louisville.
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 456-57 (1989) ("Chevron ... did more than
merely declare the victor in a forty-year war between advocates of the deferential model and
defenders of independent judgment. First, Chevron defined deference in a way that, while not
entirely unprecedented, was far more extreme than earlier articulations of the model had been.");
The Honorable Abner J. Mikva, How Shouldthe Courts TreatAdministrativeAgencies?, 36 AM.
U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1986) (Referring to Chevron's holding, he notes that "[t]his is a far reaching
development.").
3. Kenneth W. Starr, JudicialReview in the Post-ChevronEra,3 YALE J. ON REG. 283,307
(1986).
4. Id. at 312.
5. Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency InterpretationsShould Bind the Courts?, 7 YALE J.
ON REG. 1, 3 (1990). But see Stephen Breyer, JudicialReview of QuestionsofLaw and Policy,
38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1986).
6. Ronald M. Levin, JudicialReview of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39
ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 356 (1987); see also Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative
Interpretationof Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron's Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255 (1988);
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: JudicialReview ofAgency Interpretationsof
Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 301, 303 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. Rv. 2071, 2087-88 (1990).
7. But see William S. Jordan, InI, Deference Revisited: Politics as a Determinant of
Deference Doctrineand the End of the Apparent Chevron Consensus,68NEB. L. REv. 454,45877 (1989).
8. Byse, supra note 6.
9. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
10. Of course, whether the Court actually deferred or whether it would render an
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agency had interpreted the statute, the Court would "consider" the agency's
interpretation using standards developed in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.," and
give that interpretation the weight it deserved considering a variety of
factors. 2 Chevron differed from these earlier cases because it stated the

obligation to defer in powerful terms, 3 and it suggested that reviewing courts

should actually defer.' 4 In other words, they should accept agency
interpretations that are "reasonable" or that are not "arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute."'
Whether Chevron actually brought about a change in judicial conduct is
less clear. Some argue that it did produce a change. One commentator began
by asking a rhetorical question: "Does this doctrine [the Chevron doctrine]
result in fewer occasions in which a court may interpret independently?"' 6
He answered that question in the affirmative: "Manifestly it does ....07

independent decision depended on circumstances. When an agency stated its interpretation in
the form of a legislative rule, most courts would actually defer. See, e.g., Batterton v. Francis,
432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977). On the other hand, when an agency stated its interpretation in
some alternative format, most courts would make an independent interpretive decision. See, e.g.,
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
11. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1945).
12. Skidmore suggested that a reviewing court should consider "the thoroughness evident
in its [the agency's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all [other] factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power
to control.", Id. at 140.
13. The Court stated:
The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created..
program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to
fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." If Congress has explicitly
left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the
agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 213 (1974)). When there
is an implicit delegation, the agency's interpretation should be accepted provided that it is
"reasonable." Id.
14. Id. at 844. The Court stated:

[T]he Court of Appeals misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing the
regulation at issue. Once it determined, after its own examination of the legislation,
that Congress did not actually have an intent regarding the applicability of the
bubble concept to the permit program, the question before it was not whether in its
view the concept is "inappropriate" in the general context of a program designed to
improve air quality, but whether the Administrator's view that it is inappropriate in
the context of this program was a reasonable one.
Id. at 845.
15. Id. at 844.
16. Anthony, supra note 5, at 19.
17. Id. He goes on to note:
[P]rior cases showed a tendency for the courts to interpret independently when pure
questions or major questions were involved and primary interpretive authority had
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Judge Abner Mikva agreed and expressed concern about the fact that Chevron
"could lead to an erosion of the judiciary's duty: to ensure that the law is
obeyed by all, including agencies."' 8 Another commentator observed that
"Chevron's language so narrowly circumscribed the judicial function in
statutory interpretation that it was difficult, at first, to believe Justice Stevens'
opinion could be taken literally."' 9 A recent study supports these conclusions. It notes that, outside the D.C. Circuit, Chevron seems to have

significantly affected judicial conduct.20

While these assessments may be supportable, my sense is that Chevron's
importance has been exaggerated. Chevron did not profoundly alter either the
Supreme Court's conduct, or that of the lower federal courts. The Supreme
Court frequently invokes Chevron,2 but it rarely defers without carefully

scrutinizing agency interpretations. Moreover, the Court has been quite

willing to reject agency interpretations, 22 and the Court is often reluctant to

not been delegated to the agencies. But now such issues seem less likely to be
determined independently.... Chevron seems to tell the reviewing court to review
the agency interpretation only for reasonableness ratherthan to decide independently,
as it might have done in a similar case before Chevron was decided.
Id. at 19-20.
18. Mikva, supra note 2, at 7.
19. Farina, supranote 2, at 460. She went on to argue:
[O]ne need not have a deconstructionist's belief in the indeterminacy of language or
a public choice theorist's conviction in the inevitability of statutory vagueness to
appreciate that, if the court's independent role ends, whenever ambiguity is
discovered or analogy must be employed, the agency's judgment will virtually
always control the interpretive outcome.
Id. at 460-61.
20. Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To The Chevron Station: An EmpiricalStudy of
FederalAdministrativeLaw, 1990 DuKE L.J. 984.
21. See, e.g., American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 1539, 1544 (1991) ("In sum, we
believe that the meaning of § 9(b) ...is clear and contrary to the meaning advanced by
petitioner. Even if we could find any ambiguity in § 9(b) after employing the traditional tools
of statutory construction, we would still defer to the Board's reasonable interpretation of the
statutory text."); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1156, 116263 (1991); Mobil Oil Exploration & Prod. S.E., Inc. v. United Distrib. Co., Ill S. Ct. 615, 624
n.5 (1991) ("Even had we concluded that §§ 104(b)(2) and 106(c) failed to speak unambiguously
to the ceiling price question, we would nonetheless be compelled to defer to the Commission's
interpretation."); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990); see also Fort
Stewart Sch. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S. 641, 645 (1990).
22. See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S.Ct. 841, 849-50 (1992); Presley v. Etowah
County Comm'n, 112 S.Ct. 820, 831-32 (1992); Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel,
Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 130 (1990) ('The ICC argues that its conclusion is entitled to deference
because § 10701 does not specifically address the types of practices that are to be considered
unreasonable and because its construction is rational and consistent with the statute .... We
disagree."); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 483-85 (1990); Dole v. United Steelworkers of
Am., 494 U.S. 26, 41-43 (1990); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 541 (1990); Public
Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171-72 (1989); Bethesda Hosp.
Ass'n v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399,404 (1988) ('The strained interpretation offered by the Secretary
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"defer" in the sense of accepting a reasonable agency interpretation when it
prefers an alternative interpretation.' Thus, although Chevron's rhetoric
differed from Skidmore's, the scope of review remains essentially unchanged.
This Article examines recent Supreme Court decisions applying Chevron, and
offers insight into how the Court limits that decision's impact. In addition,
it also examines competing doctrines that the Supreme Court has used to
displace Chevron.
I.

CHEVRON'S HOLDING ONLY SEEMS BOLD

Chevron's holding was fairly straightforward. The Court held that
administrative officials ought to have discretion about how to interpret
regulatory provisions, and limited the scope of judicial authority.24 In doing
so, the Court recognized that agencies act under congressionally delegated
authority.25 Moreover, as courts and agencies interpret regulatory provisions,

is inconsistent with the express language ofthe statute."); ETSI Pipeline Projectv. Missouri, 484
U.S. 495,505-09 (1987); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
443-50 (1987); Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 645-47 (1986); Board of
Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368 (1986); see also University of Cal. v.
Public Employment Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589, 601-02 (1988).
23. See Breyer, supra note 5, at 379-80. Breyer argues:
[O]ne can find many cases in which the opinion suggests the court believed the
agency's legal interpretation was correct and added citations to "deference" cases
to bolster the argument. One can also find cases in which the court believed the
agency's interpretation was wrong and overturned the agency, often citing nondeference cases. But, it is more difficult to find cases where the opinion suggests
the court believed the agency was wrong in its interpretation of a statute and
nonetheless upheld the agency on "deference" principles.
Id.
24. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866
(1984).
25. According to the Court,
In these cases the Administrator's interpretation represents a reasonable
accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is therefore entitled to
deference: the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered
the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling
conflicting policies. Congress intended to accommodate both interests, but did not
do so itself on the level of specificity presented by these cases. Perhaps that body
consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this level, thinking that
those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the
provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply did not consider
the question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on
either side of the question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with
the scheme devised by the agency. For judicial purposes, it matters not which of
these things occurred.
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch
of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political
interests, but not on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast,
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they are often forced to make policy choices.26 The Court held that, in most
situations, the agency responsible for a regulatory scheme should have the
freedom to make those choices."
Agency officials usually have more

an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may,
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are
not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itselfeither inadvertently
did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than
whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge
must fail. In such a case, federal judges- whQ have no constituency- have a duty
to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for
assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between
competing views of the public interest are notjudicial ones: "Our Constitution vests
such responsibilities in the political branches."
Id. at 865-66 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).
26. The Court stated:
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than
whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge

must fail. Insuch a case, federal judges- who have no constituency- have a duty
to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for
assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between
competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: "Our Constitution vests
such responsibilities in the political branches."
We hold that the EPA's definition of the term "source" is a permissible
construction of the statute which seeks to accommodate progress in reducing air
pollution with economic growth. 'The Regulations which the Administrator has
adopted provide what the agency could allowably view as ... [an] effective
reconciliation of these twofold ends ......
Id. at 866.
27. The Court stated:
In these cases, the Administrator's interpretation represents a reasonable
accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference: the
regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a
detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting
policies. Congress intended to accommodate both interests, but did not do so itself
on the level of specificity presented by these cases. Perhaps that body consciously
desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this level, thinking that those with
great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would
be in a better position to do so; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a
coalition on either side of the question, and those on each side decided to take their
chances with the scheme devised by the agency. Forjudicial purposes, it matters not
which of these things occurred.

Id. at 837.
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expertise than courts and they are often better positioned to make interpretive
decisions. 8
Based on these considerations, the Court directed the lower courts to
engage in a two-step review process. They should first try to determine
whether Congress has been silent with respect to an interpretive issue,, or
whether it has expressed its intent ambiguously.29 As the Court stated in
Chevron, the first question in every case is whether "Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. " '
Chevron's second step provided that if Congress has in fact been silent
or ambiguous on an interpretive issue, a reviewing court should exercise only
limited review." The Court distinguished between two different situations.
In the first, Congress explicitly leaves a "gap [in the regulatory scheme] for
the agency to fill,"3 2 and directs it to promulgate regulations transforming the
generalities into specifics. 3 In this "explicit authority" situation, the agency
has "an express delegation of authority to

...

elucidate a specific provision

of the statute by regulation,"34 and its interpretation is entitled to deference35
if it is not "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."

28. According to the Court:
We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations "has been
consistently followed by the Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of
a statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the
force of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more than
ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations."
Id. at 844.
29. Id. at 842-43.
30. Id.; see also Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820, 831-32 (1992);
Norfolk & W. Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n, Ill S. Ct. 1156, 1163 (1991); Fort
Stewart Sch. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S. 641, 645 (1990); Sullivan v. Everhart,
494 U.S. 83, 84 (1990); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 290 (1988) ("'The
traditional deference courts pay to agency interpretation is not to be applied to alter the clearly
expressed intent of Congress"' (quoting Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S.
361, 368 (1986))); NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987)
(Congress' intent "must be given effect, and the regulations at issue must be fully consistent with
it.").
31. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
32. Id. at 844.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 843-44.
35. Id. at 844. The Court stated:
'The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created
*..
program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules
to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." If Congress has explicitly
left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the
agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss1/8
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When Congress has not intentionally left a gap, but rather has done so
unintentionally, deference is required nonetheless.36 The "question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute"37 and a reviewing court is not free to "substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation by the
administrator of an agency."3"
Did Chevron's two-step formulation severely limit and constrain the
scope of judicial review? Some commentators believe that Chevron did alter
the scope of review,39 and argue that the Court may have gone too far.4"
One commentator went so far as to argue that Chevron made agency

interpretations binding and gave them the "force of law."4' Based on these

assumptions, this last commentator urged courts to place strict limits on
Chevron, applying it only when agencies issue their interpretations under
expressly delegated authority:42 "A delegation, express or implied, must be
the foundation for any interpretation that can bind the courts in this fashion.
'The principle is nothing less than the principle that distinguishes democratic
government from dictatorship.""
These assessments have exaggerated Chevron'simportance." Chevron's

regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency
on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may
not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.
Id. at 843-44 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
36. Id. at 844. The Court cited Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Jong Ha Wang,
450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981), and Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60
(1975), as examples of this situation. Jong Ha Wang involved deference to the Board of
Immigration appeals, and Train involved the EPA's approval of a variance program.
37. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see also Fort Stewart Sch. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth.,
495 U.S. 641,645 (1990) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43); Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S.
83, 84 (1990); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 290 (1988); United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985); Chemical Mfr. Ass'n v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 124 (1985).
38. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; see also Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S.Ct. 820
(1992).
39. Anthony, supra note 5, at 4; Farina, supra note 2, at 460-61.
40. Mikva, supra note 2, at 7.
41. Anthony, supra note 5, at 4.

42. He would have courts ask whether "Congressintended to delegate to the agency the
power to interpretwith the force of law in the particularformat that was used." Id. at 4.
43. Id. at 40.
44. Briefly, the phrase "force of law" is a term of art that carries with it certain legal
consequences. Valid legislative rules carry the "force of law." This means that they are binding
on both the promulgating agency and regulated entities and must be followed. See United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695-96 (1974); Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533,
536 (D.C. Cir. 1986); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 3090 v. Federal Labor
Relations Auth., 777 F.2d 751, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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rhetoric, though it seemed bold, was hardly revolutionary. For nearly half-acentury, the Supreme Court had applied a similar deference standard to an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations. The leading case was, and still
is, Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co." In that case, the United States
Supreme Court stated that an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is
entitled to deference provided that the interpretation is not "plainly erroneous
or inconsistent" with the regulation's language." Courts may be more
justified in deferring when an agency interprets its own regulations,47 but
Bowles contemplated a limited judicial function like that envisioned in

Chevron.48 Moreover, even when the interpretation of a statute was at issue,

the Supreme Court had sometimes applied a controlling standard in the preChevron era, especially when an agency stated its interpretation in the form
of a legislative rule.49

Indeed, "an agency's failure to follow its own binding regulations is a reversible abuse of
discretion." Carter v. Sullivan, 909 F.2d 1201, 1202 (8th Cir. 1990). An agency may only
amend such a rule by approved procedures. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Federal
Labor Relations Auth., 777 F,2d 751, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Consumer Energy Council of Am.
v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 445-46 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Chevron gives most agency interpretations,
other than those stated in legislative rules, a status like that ofprecedent. See Russell L. Weaver,
Chenery II: A Forty-Year Retrospective, 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 161, 198-207 (1988). Such
interpretations are not binding even on the agency. Granted, Chevron suggests that a reviewing
court should accept agency interpretations, but the agencies themselves are free to disregard their
own interpretations provided that they give a reasoned explanation for their actions. Chevron,
467 U.S. at 863-64. As the Supreme Court stated in Rust v. Sullivan, I I1 S. Ct. 1759, 1769
(1991), "[tlhis Court has rejected the argument that an agency's interpretation 'is not entitled to
deference because it represents a sharp break with prior interpretations' of the statute in
question." Id. at 1769 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862). The Court went on to state that
"'[a]n initial agency interpretation is not carved in stone."' Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at
863-64). An agency is not required to "establish rules of conduct to last forever," but rather
must be allowed to "adapt its rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances."
Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
45. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
46. Id. at 414.
47. See Russell L. Weaver, JudicialInterpretation of Administrative Regulations: The
Deference Rule, 45 Prrr. L. REv. 587, 610 (1984). The author argues:
An agency is more qualified to decide between the interpretive alternatives. Its
expertise, including its greater appreciation of the subtleties and intricacies of its
regulatory program, make an agency eminently more capable than a court to make
the choice. Furthermore, when an agency interprets its own regulations, it acts under
discretionary authority delegated by Congress. Although an agency's express
authority may only allow it to promulgate, amend, and/or enforce regulations, that
authority carries with it the implied authority to interpret regulations as necessary to
the effectuation of the agency's authorized duties. When an agency issues an
interpretation pursuant to its implied authority, that interpretation, if reasonable,

should be accepted.
Id.
48. Id. at 592-93.
49. See, e.g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977). "Congress in § 407(a)

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss1/8
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In some respects, Chevron's holding was misunderstood. Chevron
deference had nothing to do with the dividing line between "democratic
government" and "dictatorship." On the contrary, Chevron was fully
consistent with traditional principles of judicial review. Courts retained their
authority, first recognized by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison,50 to "say what the law is."'" This authority continues to be
reinforced by the Administrative Procedure Act which states that a reviewing
court shall "decide all relevant questions of law."52 It is also reinforced by
Chevron itself which explicitly stated that "[t]he judiciary is the final authority

on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions
which are contrary to clear congressional intent."53
The Supreme Court's application of Chevron bears out these conclusions.

The Court's attitude is summed up by Justice Scalia's statement in Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co.:

"[D]eference is not abdication, and it requires us to accept only those agency
interpretations that are reasonable in light of the principles of construction
courts normally employ.""5 The Supreme Court has given life to Justice
Scalia's words by overriding administrative interpretations in numerous cases.56

expressly delegated to the Secretary the power to prescribe standards for determining what
constitutes 'unemployment."' Id. at 425. When such delegations exist, the agency's
interpretation is "entitled to more than mere deference or weight. It can be set aside only if the
Secretary exceeded his statutory authority or if the regulation is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."' Id. at 426.
50. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
51. Id. Of course, the courts have not always exercised their interpretive authority. See,
e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). This is especially true in the administrative law
area. The federal courts have frequently been willing to defer to administrative interpretations
of regulatory provisions. As a result, they willingly relinquish some of their interpretive
authority to other branches of government.
52. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988); see alsoZuberv. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 193 (1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1013 (1970); Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1945).
53. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9; see also Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987).
54. 111 S.Ct. 1227 (1991).
55. Id. at 1237 (Scalia, J., concurring) (He would have applied deference principles, but
would have rejected the agency's interpretation because it was unreasonable.); see also Presley
v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820, 831 (1992) ("Deference does not mean acquiescence").

56. See, e.g., Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 130 (1990)
('The, ICC argues that its conclusion is entitled to deference because § 10701 does not
specifically address the types of practices that are to be considered unreasonable and because its
construction is rational and consistent with the statute .... We disagree."); Sullivan v. Stroop,
496 U.S. 478, 483-85 (1990); Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 41-43 (1990);
Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 541 (1990); Public Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v.
Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171-72 (1989); University of Cal. v. Public EmploymentRelations Bd., 485
U.S. 589, 602 (1988) ("Because we have been able to ascertain Congress' clear intent based on
our analysis of the statutes and their legislative history, we need not address the issue of
deference to the agency."); Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, 404 (1988) ('The
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How has the Supreme Court been able to reject interpretations despite
Chevron's strong, pro-deference language? The answer lies in Chevron itself.
The Chevron doctrine does not require reviewing courts to automatically
accept all administrative interpretations that come before them. It requires,
instead, that they carefully examine and evaluate those interpretations. In
other words, it requires them to exercise judgment. Of course, the necessity
for judgment is Chevron'sstrength as well as its weakness. Reviewing courts
have much freedom to override or reject administrative interpretations. As

Judge Abner Mikva noted, Chevron's test is "ad hoc and malleable," and is
"like the length of the chancellor's foot in equity court; it varies from
chancellor to chancellor."57 In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has
exercised its discretion and has rejected agency interpretations.

II. CHEVRON: THE DISCRETION REVEALED
Analysis of the Supreme Court's post-Chevron decisions offers much
insight into how the Court limits Chevron's impact.
A. Chevron's Focus On CongressionalIntent
Under Chevron, agencies have not been given unfettered discretion to
interpret regulatory provisions. On the contrary, in Chevron, the Supreme
Court explicitly recognized that both courts and agencies are bound by
congressional intent.58 While this approach may be both necessary and
desirable, it has created many problems. In many instances, congressional
intent cannot be precisely ascertained.59 Professor Max Radin once argued
that the concept of legislative intent is nonsense: a legislature "has no intention
whatsoever in connection with words which some two or three men drafted,
which a considerable number rejected, and in regard to which many of the
approving majority might have had, and often demonstrably did have,

strained interpretation offered by the Secretary is inconsistent with the express language of the
statute."); ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 516-17 (1988); Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-49 (1987); Bowen v. American
HIosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 645-47 (1986); Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474
U.S. 361, 368 (1986).
57. Mikva, supra note 2, at 8-9; see also Pierce, supra note 6, at 314. According to Pierce,
"The conceptual framework established by Chevron will not eliminate all difficult cases; nor will
it eliminate completely the influence of each judge's personal political philosophy on the process
ofjudicial review of agency actions. Those goals are unattainable through any means." Id. He
goes on to note that "[tihey are important goals, however, and the Chevron framework provides
a means to further those goals incrementally." Id.
58. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; see also Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct.
820 (1992); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116,
125 (1985) ("if Congress has clearly expressed an intent contrary to that of the Agency, our duty
is to enforce the will of Congress.").
59. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 68
(1975); Warren Lehman, How To Interpreta Difficult Statute, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 489, 500.
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different ideas and beliefs."' Charles Curtis agreed: It "is a hallucination,
this search for intent. The room is always dark. The hat we are looking for
is often black. If it is there at all, it is on our own head."'Q Even Justice
Frankfurter questioned the intent concept: "All these years I have avoided
speaking 62of 'legislative intent' and I shall continue to be on my guard against
using it."

Despite these concerns, the Supreme Court has never been able to
completely avoid or escape the intent concept.63 There are good reasons.
The Constitution vests primary lawmaking authority in Congress." When
courts construe statutes, they have much discretion.' But the Court has

60. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930). He went on
to state:
The chances that of several hundred men each will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind as possible reductions of a given determinable, are
infinitesmally small. The chance is still smaller that a given determinate, the
litigated issue, will not only be within the minds of all these men but will be certain
to be selected by all of them as the present limit to which the determinable should
be narrowed.
Id. For a response to these arguments, see DICKERSON, supra note 59, at 67-102; James M.
Landis, A Note on "StatutoryInterpretation,"43 HARV.L. REV. 886 (1930).
61. Charles P. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation,3 VAND. L. REv. 407, 409

(1950).
62. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading ofStatutes,47 COLuM. L. REv. 527,
538 (1947). Justice Holmes agreed: "Only a day or two ago when counsel talked of the
intention of a legislature, I was indiscreet enough to say I don't care what their intention was.
I only want to know what the words mean." Id.
63. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116,
125 (1985) ("if Congress has clearly expressed an intent contrary to that of the Agency, our duty
is to enforce the will of Congress."); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 ("[TMhe court, as well as the

agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
64. See DIcKERsON, supra note 59, at 7:
The first assumption is that the general powers of government are constitutionally allocated among the three central branches in such a way that, although it does
not enjoy an exclusive power to make substantive law, the legislative branch
exercises lawmaking power that takes precedence over the lawmaking powers
respectively exercised by the executive and judicial branches.
65. Justice Frankfurter argued that "[t]he area of free judicial movement is considerable."
Frankfurter, supra note 62, at 533. There are many reasons:
Anything that is written may present a problem of meaning, and that is the essence
of the business of judges in construing legislation. The problem derives from the
very nature of words. They are symbols of meaning. But unlike mathematical
symbols, the phrasing of a document, especially a complicated enactment, seldom
attains more than approximate precision. If individual words are inexact symbols,
with shifting variables, their configuration can hardly achieve invariant meaning or
assured definiteness. Apart from the ambiguity inherent in its symbols, a statute
suffers from dubieties. It is not an equation or a formula representing a clearly
marked process, nor is it an expression of individual thought to which is imparted
the definiteness a single authorship can give. A statute is an instrument of
government partaking of its practical purposes but also of its infirmities and
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generally assumed that respect for legislative authority limits the Court's

discretion. Justice Frankfurter, despite his concerns about the intent concept,
believed that courts were not "at large":
They are confined by the nature and scope of the judicial function ....
They are under the constraints imposed by the judicial function in our
democratic society. As a matter of verbal recognition certainly, no one will
gainsay that the function in construing a statute is to ascertain the meaning
of words used by the legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power
which our democracy has lodged in its elected legislature.6

Because of these concerns, the intent concept keeps resurfacing. Even
those who purport to reject the concept are often found "resorting to
euphemisms to describe it."'67 According to Justice Frankfurter, "[o]ur
problem is not what do ordinary English words mean, but what did Congress
mean them to mean."68 Radin argued that a legislature may "foreclose any
attempt by the administration and judiciary to displace what the legislature
regards as the more important of the purposes to be achieved."
This
statement produced a retort from Professor Dickerson: "If hundreds of men
can subjectively 'regard' something, it may not strain credulity to conclude
that they could also 'intend' it."70 7 As a result, the Supreme Court has
continued to use the intent concept. '
But the mere fact that the Court feels itself bound by congressional intent
does not eliminate the difficulty, identified by Radin and others, of ascertaining that intent.72 As the justices interpret statutes, they usually have some

limitations, of its awkward and groping efforts.
Id. at 528.
66. Id. at 533.
67. DICKERSON, supra note 59, at 77.
68. Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 95 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
69. Max Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 56 HARv. L. REv. 388, 412 (1942) (emphasis
added).
70. DICKERsON, supra note 59, at 78.
71. Justice Holmes summed up the Court's attitude when he quipped, "Ifmy fellow citizens
want to go to Hell I will help them. It's my job." I HOLMES-LASKI LETrERS 249 (Mark Howe
ed., 1953).
72. Professor Dickerson suggests that the act of interpretation may involve a greater or
lesser degree of creativity depending on the extent to which legislative intent is ascertainable:
Perhaps a happier analogy to a court's function of disposing of an authentic
problem of meaning would be that of the restorer who makes a substitute for a small
piece missing from the body of an ancient vase. Here, he is guided by the adjacent
contours and, if he is skillful, the result blends well enough to attract little or no
attention and the vase can be enjoyed as an integrated whole. His job is harder if
the vase has been decorated, but the difficulty is small if the decoration follows a
discernible pattern.
On the other hand, suppose that the craftsman has only the piece that was missing
in the first example and the decoration is free and nonrecurrent. Suppose that he
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indicia of intent at their disposal-such as committee reports and other
historical materials-but individually or cumulatively those indicia are often
inconclusive. In addition, the justices do not always agree about how
congressional intent is to be determined,' or which materials may be
considered in the interpretive process.74 They take divergent approaches that
lead them to disagree about what Congress did and did not intend.
B. Intent and Chevron
The Court's focus on legislative intent, and the difficulties the Court has
experienced in ascertaining that intent, have severely limited the Chevron
doctrine. The logic behind this statement may not be readily apparent. In
fact, one might assume the opposite: if legislative intent is difficult to
ascertain, then agency authority ought to be enhanced. A reviewing court
might more readily conclude that Congress has been silent or ambiguous with
respect to an interpretive issue, and therefore might conclude that it is required
to defer. This has not been the case. In its post-Chevron deference decisions,
the Court has engaged in an extensive review process.
The "Chevron" process involves consideration of the various tools and
principles of statutory construction." As the Court stated in NLRB v. United

wishes to incorporate it into a projected vase with which it will be aesthetically and
culturally compatible. Suppose that, drawing on his imaginative understanding of
the relevant cultural context, he produces such a vase.
DICKERSON, supra note 59, at 26.
73. Judge Patricia Wald observed:

Today, there appear to be few, if any, restrictions on what judges may look at
to discern legislative intent or purpose. Yet, if legislative history is now scanned in
every case of statutory construction, rarely is it determinative of the outcome. It

competes with presumptions and canons of construction: some old, some newly
derived, and many reflecting the policies n our wide-ranging legal and constitutional
system that most commend themselves to the majority of judges. The legislative
materials at our disposal of course do not, and probably never will, accurately and
comprehensively record what actually took place during the convoluted process of
enactment. Ironically, records of some of the most vital phases are not generally
available, and the presumption that legislators know all about past laws and the
interpretations agencies put upon them must increasingly be viewed with skepticism.
Language never seems plain enough in its meaning to forestall the hunt for
enlightenment in the legislative context. The work of the courts and of the
legislature becomes more difficult, not easier. In the final analysis, we must count
on Congress itself-cumbersome as its processes may be-to correct us through new
legislation when we read it wrong on the issues it cares about most.
Patricia M. Wald, Some Observationson the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme

Court Term, 68 IoWA L. REv. 195, 216 (1983).
74. See id. at 215-16.
75. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 ("If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that
intention is the law and must be given effect."); accordPension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV
Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 647 (1990); University of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 485
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Food & Commercial Workers Union,76 "On a pure question of statutory

construction, our first job is to try to determine congressional intent, using

'traditional tools of statutory construction.'

If we can do so, then that

interpretation must 7be given effect, and the regulations at issue must be fully
consistent with it."
Becausethe Court uses these "tools of construction" in applying Chevron,
the Court has retained much discretion about when deference is required. The
"tools" themselves are supposed to aid the Court in ascertaining Congress'
intent, but the justices have not always been able to agree about how they
apply.

1. Statutory Language
Under Chevron, the Court usually begins its analysis by examining a
statute's language.78 In some instances, the Court concludes that the statute
suffers from neither silence nor ambiguity. As a result, the Court refuses to
defer to an administrative interpretation, especially if it is inconsistent with the
Court's assumptions regarding congressional intent. Illustrative is the holding
in ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri."' In that case, the Supreme Court
rejected the Secretary of the Interior's interpretation of the Flood Control
Act."0 The Secretary had held that he could enter into a contract without the
approval of the Army.' The Court disagreed, holding that the Act "[spoke]
directly to the dispute in [the] case, and congressional intent as expressed in
the Act indicate[d] clearly that the Interior Secretary [could] not enter into a
contract to withdraw water from an Army reservoir for industrial use" without

U.S. 589, 603 (1988) (White, J.,
concurring); NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers,
484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 446-48 (1987). At least one commentator has argued that it is inappropriate for the Court
to consider such tools. See Anthony, supra note 5, at 19 ("But if it fails to find such intent, the
court should not then use the 'traditional tools' to perform an independent interpretation of the
ambiguous statute. Instead, it should move to Step 2 and evaluate the agency's interpretations.").
76. 484 U.S. 112 (1987).
77. Id. at 123; see also Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
dissenting) ("Chevron'sdeferencerequirement, however,
470 U.S. 116, 152 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
was explicitly limited to cases in which congressional intent cannot be discerned through the use
of the traditional techniques of statutory interpretation.").
78. See, e.g., Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820, 831-32 (1992);
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429-32 (1987); Board
of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368-71 (1986); United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1985); see also Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v.
Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 133 (1990); Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S.
26, 35 (1990).
79. 484 U.S. 495 (1988).
80. Id. at 506.
81. Id. at 505.
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approval."2 As a result, the Court rejected the agency's interpretation holding
that, because the Act was clear, "[t]hat [was] 'the end of the matter."' 83
In applying Chevron, the Court frequently invokes the so-called "plain
meaning" rule.' 4 This rule states that "[w]ords should be read as saying what
they mean,"' s and it "reaffirms the preeminence of the statute over materials
extrinsic to it.",8 6 The Court applied this rule in Bethesda HospitalAss'n v.
Bowen.87 That case involved the Provider Reimbursement Review Board's
("Board") conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to hear petitioners' claims.8"
The Board's conclusion was based on its own construction of its governing
statute.89 The Supreme Court disagreed with the agency's construction. In
the Court's view, "[t]he plain meaning of the statute decides the issue
presented." 9° The Court concluded that the agency's interpretation was
"strained" and "inconsistent with the plain language of the statute." 9'
But the Court's use of the plain meaning rule is fraught with problems.
As Justice Frankfurter once observed, "[tihe notion that because the words of
a statute are plain, its meaning is also plain, is merely a pernicious oversimplification."92 Many "hard" cases are presented in which a statute's text seems
plain, but other considerations suggest that the statute should be differently
interpreted. For these reasons, some view "the plain meaning rule... [as] a
'soft' rule-the plainest meaning can be trumped by contradictory legislative
history."'93 Indeed, one Canadian writer jestingly claimed that U.S. courts are

82. Id. at 517.

83. Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842).
84. See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988); Bethesda Hosp.
Ass'n v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, 403 (1988) ('The plain meaning of the statute decides the issue
presented."); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429-32
(1987); Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 371 (1986).
85. DICKERsON, supra note 59, at 229.

86. Id.
87. 485 U.S. 399 (1988).
88. Id. at 402.
89. Id.

90. Id. at 403.
91. Id. at 404. The Court also concluded that the agency's interpretation was inconsistent
with "the language and design of the statute as a whole." Id. at 405.

92. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424,431 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also
FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 625 n.7 (1982) (quoting Frankfurter's statement in Monia);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Contextualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
93. Eskridge, supra note 92, at 626. Judge Patricia Wald agrees. After examining the
Court's use of legislative history during its 1982 term, she concluded that "[n]o occasion for
statutory construction now exists when the Court will not look at the legislative history." Wald,
supra note 73, at 195. She went on to state that
although the Court still refers to the "plain meaning" rule, the rule has effectively
been laid to rest. No occasion for statutory construction now exists when the Court
will not look at the legislative history. When the plain meaning rhetoric is invoked,
it becomes a device not for ignoring legislative history but for shifting onto
legislative history the burden of proving that the words do not mean what they
appear to say.
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so inclined to examine historical materials that they use the opposite rule:
only when
94 the legislative history is ambiguous is it permissible to refer to the
statute.
These problems manifest themselves in the Court's post-Chevron

decisions. 9 Rarely will the Court find that language is plain and therefore

conclude that there is no need to examine legislative history. In Immigration

96 the Court found that the
& Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
Act's plain language required it to reject the agency's interpretation: "As we
have explained, the plain language of this statute appears to settle the question
before us."97 But the Court proceeded to examine historical materials:
"Therefore, we look to the legislative history to determine only whether there
is 'clearly expressed legislative intention' contrary to that language, which
would cause us to question the strong presumption that Congress expresses its
intent through the language it uses."98
Ii some cases, the justices find that statutory language is not "plain" even
though it appears to be quite plain. In, for example, UnitedStates v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc.,99 the Court concluded that, "[o]n a purely linguistic

Id.
94. DICKERSON, supranote 59, at 164 (quoting J.A. Corry, The Use ofLegislative History
in the Interpretationof Statutes, 32 CAN.BAR REv. 624, 636 (1954)).
95. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 111 S.Ct. 1156
(1991); University of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 108 S. Ct. 1404 (1988); NLRB
v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
96. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
97. Id. at 432 n.12.
98. Id. In Board of Governors v. Dimension Finance Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986), the Court
concluded early in its opinion that the Federal Reserve Board's interpretation was not an
"accurate or reasonable interpretation of" the Bank Holding Company Act. Id. at 368. The
Court reached that conclusion based on the Act's language. Id. The Court stated:
By the 1966 amendments to § 2(c), Congress expressly limited the Act to regulation

of institutions that accept deposits that "the depositor has a legal right to withdraw
on demand." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c). The Board would now define "legal right" as
meaning the same as "a matter of practice." But no amount of agency expertise-however sound may be the result-can make the words "legal right" mean a
right to do something "as a matter of practice." A legal right to withdraw on
demand means just that: a right to withdraw deposits without prior notice or
limitation. Institutions offering NOW accounts do not give the depositor a legal
right to withdraw on demand; rather, the institution itself retains the ultimate legal
right to require advance notice of withdrawal. The Board's definition of "demand
deposit," therefore, is not an accurate or reasonable interpretation of § 2(c).
Id. Nevertheless, the Court continued to analyze the issue for five more pages. In its analysis,
the Court examined the Act's legislative history. Only after this discussion, was the Court able
to conclude that "[n]othing in the statutory language or the legislative history, therefore,
indicate[d] that the term 'commercial loan' meant anything different from its accepted ordinary
commercial usage." Id. at 373.
99. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
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level," the agency's interpretation appeared to be unreasonable. 00 But the
Court decided not to resolve the case on a "purely linguistic" basis. According
to the Court, this view "does justice neither to the problem faced by the Corps
in defining the scope of its authority under § 404(a) nor to the realities of the
problem of water pollution that the Clean Water Act was intended to
combat."' 0 '
Similarly, in Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.," 2 the Court was asked to interpret the
word "modify."'0 3 The Court refused to read the word "in its broadest
sense," °4 concluding that such a reading would not make sense." 5
Instead, the Court construed the word in light of the statute's purpose and
structure, as well as in light of its legislative history."°
In a number of cases, some justices find that language is "plain," while
others do not.'0 7 In the Chemical Manufacturers case, the majority found
that the word "modify" was not plain and deferred to the EPA's interpretation
of the word.' Justice Marshall, joined by several other justices, argued that
the "plain meaning" rule required the Court to reject that interpretation:
The Court today defers to EPA's interpretation of the Clean Water Act even
though that interpretation is inconsistent with the clear intent of Congress,

100. Id. at 132.
101. Id.
102. 470 U.S. 116 (1985).

103. Id. at 125-26.
104. Id. at 125.
105. Id. at 125-26. According to the Court,
If the word "modify" in § 301(1) is read in its broadest sense, that is, to encompass
any change or alteration in the standards, NRDC is correct. But it makes little sense
to construe the section to forbid EPA to amend its own standards, even to correct
an error or to impose stricter requirements. Furthermore, reading § 301(1) in this
manner would forbid what § 307(b)(2) expressly directs: EPA is there required to

"revise" its pretreatment standards "from time to time, as control technology,
processes, operating methods, or other alternatives change." As NRDC does and
must concede, . . . , § 301(1) cannot be read to forbid every change in the toxic
waste standards. The word "modify" thus has no plain meaning as used in § 301 (1),
and is the proper subject of construction by EPA and the courts.

Id.
106. Id. at 126.
107. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1156
(1991). In University of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589 (1988), the
majority concluded that it was able to "ascertain Congress' clear intent" based on its analysis of
the statutes and their legislative history. Id. at 602. Justice White, concurring, found that "the
language of neither exception settles the matter." Id. at 603. In Immigration & Naturalization
Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), the majority declared, "[T]he plain language
of this statute appears to settle the question before us." Id. at 432 n.12. As a result, the Court
rejected the Immigration and Naturalization Service's interpretation of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. Justice Powell, joined by two other justices, dissented, arguing that he found
"the language far more ambiguous than the Court [did]." Id. at 459.
108. Chemical Mfrs., 470 U.S. at 125.
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as evidenced by the statutory language, history, structure, and purpose. I
had not read our cases to permit judicial deference to an agency's
construction of a statute
1°9 when that construction is inconsistent with the clear
intent of Congress.

Similarly, in Dole v. United Steelworkers of America,"0 the majority
concluded that a statute was "plain" and therefore rejected the Office of
Management and Budget's (OMB) interpretation of the statute."' Justices
White and Rehnquist disagreed. In their view, the statute did not clearly

109. Id. at 135.

110. 494 U.S. 26 (1990).
111. Id. at 34-40. The case involved the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (Act), 44 U.S.C.
§§ 3501-3520 (1988, Supp. 11989 & Supp. I 1990). Under that Act, "information collection
requests" had to be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review. Id.
§ 3507(a)(2). If OMB fails to approve the request, the agency may not collect the information.
Id. § 3507(a)(3).
The Department of Labor (DOL) promulgated a disclosure rule requiring employers to
disclose certain health risks to their employees. OMB rejected the disclosure requirement. It
reasoned that the rules were not necessary to protect employees. Dole, 494 U.S. at 30-31.
In Dole, the Supreme Court was forced to determine whether Congress intended to apply
the Act to such disclosure rules. In other words, when an agency requires employers to disclose
health risks to its employees, has the agency imposed an "information collection request?"
Petitioner argued that the Act's operative provisions, applicable to "obtaining or soliciting of
facts by an agency through ... reporting or recordkeeping requirements," applied to such
disclosure rules. Id. at 34-35. In other words, the agency is "soliciting facts" when it "requires
someone to communicate specified data to a third party." Id. The Court rejected this contention:
"Petitioner's interpretation of 'obtaining or soliciting facts by an agency through... reporting
or recordkeeping requirements' is not the most natural reading of this language." Id. The Court
found that the "common sense" interpretation of this language was that it applies to "reports to
be made to the government, not training and labels to be given to someone else altogether." Id.
at 35-36. As a result, because the Court found "that the statute, as a whole, clearly expresse[d]
Congress' intention, [it] decline[d] to defer to OMB's interpretation." Id. at 42.
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they would have deferred to the agency's
express Congress' intent." 2 Thus,
3
interpretation of the statute:"
Since the statute itself is not clear and unambiguous, the legislative history

is muddy at best, and [since] OMB has given the statute what I believe is
a permissible construction, I cannot agree with the outcome the Court
reaches. If Chevron is to have meaning, it must apply when a statute is as
ambiguous on the issue at hand as [this statute] is on the subject of
disclosure requirements."'

When the Court finds that language is "plain," it often uses that language
to reject agency interpretations. In Public Employees Retirement System of
Ohio v. Betts,"5 an EEOC regulation defined the term "subterfuge."' 6

112. Id. at 44-46 (White, J., dissenting). According to Justice White,
The Court concedes that the Act does not expressly address "whether Congress
intended the Paperwork Reduction Act to apply to disclosure rules as well as
information-gathering rules." Curiously, the Court then almost immediately asserts
that interpreting the Act to provide coverage for disclosure requests is untenable.
The plain language of the Act, however, suggests the contrary. Indeed, the Court
appears to acknowledge that Petitioners' interpretation of the Act, although not the
one the Court prefers, is nonetheless reasonable: "Petitioner's interpretation ...is
not the most natural reading of this language." The Court goes on to arrive at what
it believes is the most reasonable of plausible interpretations; it cannot rationally
conclude that its interpretation is the only one that Congress could possibly have
intended. The Court neglects to even mention that the only other Court of Appeals
besides the Third Circuit in this case to address a similar question rejected the
interpretation the Court now adopts. In addition, there is evidence that for years
OMB has been reviewing proposals similar to the standard at issue in this case
routinely and without objection from other agencies. As I see it, by independently
construing the statute rather than asking if the agency's interpretation is a permissible
one and deferring to it if that is the case, the Court's approach is clearly contrary to
Chevron.
Id. (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 43. According to Justices White and Rehnquist:
The Court's opinion.., requires more than ten pages, including a review of
numerous statutory provisions and legislative history, to conclude that the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1980 (PRA or Act) is clear and unambiguous on the question of
whether it applies to agency directives to private parties to collect specified
information and disseminate or make it available to third parties. On the basis of
that questionable conclusion, the Court refuses to give any deference to the Office
of Management and Budget's (OMB's) longstanding and consistently applied
interpretation that such requirements fall within the Act's scope. Because in my
view the Act is not clear in that regard and deference is due OMB under Chevron
* . . I respectfully dissent.

Id. at 43-44.
114. Id. at 53. In Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 103 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting),
the four justices voted to reject an administrative interpretation.

115. 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
116. Id. at 170-72.
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The majority refused to defer on the basis that the agency's interpretation was
"at odds with the plain language of the statute itself."" 7 The Court went on
to state that, "[b]ut of course, no deference is due to agency interpretations at
odds with the plain language of the statute itself. Even contemporaneous and
longstanding agency interpretations
must fall to the extent they conflict with
8
statutory language.""1
Justice Brennan, dissenting, strongly disagreed with the majority's
conclusion: "To reach the result it does, the majority uses an interpretive
methodology, purportedly one parsing § 4(f)(2)'s "plain language," which is
so manipulative as virtually to invite the charge of result-orientation."' 9 He
went on to state that:
Ordinarily, we ascertain the meaning of a statutory provision by looking to
its text, and if the statutory language is unclear, to its legislative history.

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1547, 79 L.Ed.2d 891
(1984). Where these barometers offer ambiguous guidance as to Congress'
intent, we defer to the interpretations of the provision articulated by the
agencies responsible for its enforcement, so long as these agency interpretations are "based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council,Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843,
104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) ....

Eschewing this approach, the majority begins its analysis not by
seeking to glean meaning from the statute, but by launching a no-holds-

barred attack on the business purpose reading of § 4(f(2). Ante, at 2862
into two portions, the majority concludes that the business purpose test is
irreconcilable with the "plain language" of the "subterfuge" portion, ante,
at 2862-2864, and also cannot be inferred from the text of the portion
enumerating types of employee benefit plans. Ante, at 2864-2865. En
route to interring the consensus interpretation of § 4(f)(2), the majority
pauses not a moment on the provision's purposes or legislative history.
Only after burial, and almost by afterthought, does the majority attempt to
come up with its own interpretation of the exemption, hastily proceeding to
divine the capacious alternative reading outlined earlier.
There are deep problems with the majority's interpretive methodology,

chief among them its unwillingness to apply the same unforgiving textual
analysis to its reading of the § 4(f)(2) exemption as it does to the consensus
120
reading ....

117. Id. at 171.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 185.
120. Id. at 185-86 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843) (citations omitted).
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2. The Statutory Scheme
In deciding whether to apply Chevron, the justices also consider a
provision's language in reference to the entire "statutory scheme."', In K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier,Inc.,'2 the Court flatly stated that a reviewing "court
must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language
and design of the statute as a whole."'I
This approach to statutory interpretation, referred to by Judge Kenneth
Starr as "structuralism," 24 provides a useful interpretive technique. 2 1 It
treats the interpretive process as a "holistic endeavor,"'' and suggests that
"different answers may emerge from a study of the whole that might not be
suggested by a narrowly focused parsing of a solitary provision in a complex
statute."'2 7 Some have hailed this new "structuralism" as portending
"somewhat greater consistency and predictability in the interpretive pro128
cess."'

In Chevron itself, the Court invoked structuralism. The Court was forced
to define the term "stationary source."29 In doing so, the Court refused to
"parse" general terms in the statute.
The Court flatly stated that "the
meaning of a word must be ascertained in the context of achieving particular
objectives, and the words associated with it may indicate [that] the true
meaning of the series is to convey a common idea."'30 Although the Court
found that congressional intent was unclear, it noted that "to the extent that
congressional 'intent' can be discerned from this language, it would appear

121. See, e.g., Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759, 2768
(1990); Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1990) (rejecting the agency's
interpretation noting that, since "the statute, as a whole, clearly expresses Congress' intention,
we decline to defer to OMB's interpretation."); EEOC v. Commercial Office Prod. Co., 486 U.S.
107, 121 (1988); Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, 405 (1988) ("While the express
language ofsubsection (a) requires the result we reach in the present case, our conclusion is also
supported by the language and design of the statute as a whole."); ETSI Pipeline Project v.
Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 514 (1988) ("the language, structure, and legislative history of the Act
fail to support the petitioners in this case .... "); NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers
Union, 484 U.S. 112, 124 (1987) ('The words, structure, and history of the LMRA amendments
to the NLRA clearly reveal that Congress intended to differentiate between the General Counsel's
and the Board's 'final authority' along a prosecutorial versus adjudicatory line."); Chemical Mfr.
Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 126 (1985) (Court obligated
to defer to "the Agency's view of the statute.., unless the legislative history or the purpose and
structure of the statute clearly reveal a contrary intent on the part of Congress.").
122. 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
123. Id. at 291; see also Fort Stewart Sch. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S. 641,
645 (1990); Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 89 (1990).
124. Starr, supra note 3, at 706.
125. Id.
126. United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs, 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
127. Starr, supra note 3, at 708.
128. Id. at 707.
129. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 861.
130. Id.
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that the listing of overlapping, illustrative terms was intended to enlarge,
rather than to confine, the scope of the agency's power3 to regulate particular
sources in order to effectuate the policies of the Act."' '
But, just as the justices can disagree about whether a statute's language
is plain, they can also disagree about the implications to be derived from
analysis of a statute's structure.'
In addition, they can use structuralism
to reject agency interpretations. In Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary
Steel, Inc.,133 one provision of the Interstate Commerce Commission Act
(ICC Act)33 required carriers to charge reasonable, nondiscriminatory
rates. ' Another provision prohibited them from charging a rate different
than that previously filed with the ICC. Some shippers had negotiated new
rates with carriers that were below the filed rates. These negotiated rates were
never filed. When some of the carriers went into bankruptcy, the bankruptcy
trustee billed the carrier for the difference between the filed rate and the rate
actually charged. The ICC viewed the billing as an "unreasonable" practice
that, under the terms of the ICC Act, precluded collection of the additional
amount.
The Supreme Court had to decide whether the ICC's interpretation was
entitled to deference. The ICC, after pointing out that the Act did "not
specifically address the types of practices that are to be considered unreasonable," argued that its interpretation was "rational and consistent with the
statute," and urged the Court to defer to that interpretation. 36 A majority
of the Court disagreed, concluding that the ICC's position "rests on an
interpretation of the Act that is contrary to the language and structure of the
statute as a whole and the requirements that make up the filed rate doctrine in
particular."' 37 In doing so, the Court relied on its prior interpretations of the
statute. 138 But the Court also relied on its assessment of the regulatory
scheme. The Court concluded that "[a]lthough the Commission has both the
authority and expertise generally to adopt new policies when faced with new

131. Id. at 862.
132. In Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), the Court used structuralism. But the justices viewed
that structure differently. The majority viewed the Act's structure as requiring a particular result,
id. at 180, while the dissenters viewed the structure as requiring the opposite result, id. at 187.
133. 497 U.S. 116 (1990).
134. 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11917 (1988).
135. Id. §§ 10101(a), 10701(a), 10741(b).

136. Maislin Indus., 110 S.Ct. at 2968.
137. Id.
138. Id. The Court stated:
The ICC argues that its conclusion is entitled to deference because § 10701 does not

specifically address the types ofpractices that are to be considered unreasonable and
because its construction is rational and consistent with the statute ....
We disagree. For a century, this Court has held the Act, as it incorporates the
filed rate doctrine, forbids as discriminatory the secret negotiation and collection of
rates lower than the filed rate .... By refusing to order collection of the filed rate
solely because the parties had agreed to a lower rate, the ICC has permitted the very
price discrimination the Act by its terms seeks to prohibit.
Id. at 2768 (citations omitted).
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developments in the industry,. . . it does not have the power to adopt a policy
that directly conflicts with its governing statute."'39
Dissenting, Justice Stevens argued that "no 4particular provision of the
,,n He contended that the
statute support[ed] the Court's position ....
Court had failed to adhere to Chevron:
Four Courts of Appeals have expressly invoked Chevron in the course of
upholding the agency action challenged in this case, but this Court does not
deem Chevron--orany other case involving deference to agency actionworthy of extended discussion. The Court dismisses Chevron by means of
a conclusory assertion that the agency's interpretation is inconsistent with
"the statutory scheme as a whole."'14 Justice Stevens concluded, quoting
Mr. Justice Black, that "I am unable
142 to understand why the Court strains so

hard to reach such a bad result.'

3. Statutory Purposes
In applying Chevron, the Court also considers the "policies underlying
[an] Act."'43 "Purposes" or "policies" have long been considered in
r..

statutory construction. As Justice Frankfurter stated:

Legislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an
inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of government.
That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evinced
in the language of the statute, as read in the light of other external
manifestations of purpose. That is what the judge must seek and effectuate,
and he ought not1 44be led off the trail by tests that have overtones of
subjective design.

In numerous post-Chevron deference decisions, the Court has considered an

Act's purposes. 45 For example, in United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 46 the Court deferred to an interpretation by the Army Corps

139. Id. at 2770.
140. Id. at 2775 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 2779.
142. Id. at 2780 (quoting T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 481 (1959) (Black,
J., dissenting)).
143. See, e.g., EEOC v. Commercial Office Prod. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 116 (1988); United
States v. City of Fulton, 475 U.S. 657, 671 (1986); Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp.,
474 U.S. 361, 373 (1986); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131
(1985) ("Accordingly, our review is limited to the question whether it [the agency's interpretation] is reasonable, in light of the language, policies, and legislative history of the Act for the
Corps to exercise jurisdiction .... ).
144. Frankfurter, supra note 62, at 538-39.
145. See, e.g., Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 36-40 (1990); Dimension
Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. at 73-74; Riverside Bayview Homes,Inc., 474 U.S. at 32 "[A]n agency may

appropriately look to the ... underlying policies of its statutory grants of authority.").
146. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
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of Engineers after noting that the "legislative history and underlying policies"
"support the reasonableness of the Corps' approach .... ,, 47
* But, even though the concept of "legislative purpose" can be useful, it has
its limits. Radin, as part of his attack on the concept of intent, similarly
attacked the purpose concept: "If by the purpose of a statute we mean the
actual purpose entertained by those who framed it or voted it, the purpose is
indistinguishable from the intention."' 48 As a result, he concluded "that this
purpose
is practically undiscoverable and would be irrelevant if discov, 149
ered."
Part of the problem stems from the fact that the most legitimate way to
ascertain legislative purposes is by examining a statute's language. In Board
of Governors v. Dimension FinancialCorp.,150 the Court stated that "[t]he
'plain purpose' of legislation, however, is determined in the first instance with
reference to the plain language of the statute itself."'' But the Court also
recognized that, if a court tries to go beyond "the language of the statute
itself," there is always the potential for abuse:
Congress may be unanimous in its intent to stamp out some vague social or
economic evil; however, because its members may differ sharply on the
means for effectuating that intent, the final language of the legislation may
reflect hard fought compromises. Invocation of the "plain purpose" of
legislation at the expense of the terms of the statute itself takes no account
of the processes of compromise and, in the end, prevents the effectuation
of congressional intent.r52

As a result, as the Court recognized in Dimension Financial, the use of
"'broad purposes' at the expense of specific provisions ignores the complexity
of the problems Congress is called upon to address and the dynamics of
legislative action."'5' But, if the Court limits itself to a statute's language,
the usefulness of the purpose concept diminishes.
Disagreements about congressional purposes have been evident in the
Court's post-Chevron deference decisions.' The justices often differ about
which purposes are relevant, and how those purposes affect a case's
resolution. In the Chemical Manufacturers'55 case, the majority considered
a statute's purposes in holding that an agency's interpretation was entitled to
deference: "EPA's construction, fairly understood, is not inconsistent with the

147. Id. at 132; see also DimensionFin., 474 U.S. at 373 (stating that "[tihe 'plain purpose'
of legislation, however, is determined in the first instance with reference to the plain language
of the statute itself.").
148. Radin, supra note 60, at 875.
149. Id.

150. 474 U.S. 361 (1986).
151. Id. at 373.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 374.
Id. at 373-74.
See, e.g., Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992).
Chemical Mfr.Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
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language, goals, or operation of the Act."' 5 6 Justice Marshall, joined by
three other justices, took issue with the Court's decision to defer noting that
his "disagreement with the Court does not center on its reading of Chevron,
57
but instead on its analysis of the congressional purposes behind § 301(1).'
Justice Marshall concluded, "It is readily apparent that a complete ban on
modifications would most directly and completely accomplish the congressional goal."'5 8
In Dole v. United Steelworkers ofAmerica,'59 the justices also disagreed
about the purpose of an act. In rejecting the Office of Management and
Budget's construction of a statutory provision, 6 ' the majority placed great
emphasis on Congress' stated purposes: "Disclosure rules present none of the
problems Congress sought to solve through the Paperwork Reduction Act
(PRA), and none of Congress' enumerated purposes would be served by
subjecting disclosure rules to the provisions of the Act."'' Justice White,
joined by Justice Rehnquist, disagreed: "Contrary to the Court's assertions,
disclosure requests do present some of the problems Congress sought to solve
They concluded by arguing that the Court's
through the PRA."'
"distinction [was] flawed because it promote[d] a secondary objective of the
ignore[d] ...
PRA and
,

Congress's primary objective in enacting the

statute. 163

156. Id. at 134.
157. Id. at 152 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 142.
159. 494 U.S. 26 (1990).
160. The question was whether the OMB had the right to review the Secretary of Labor's
rule requiring employers to make certain disclosures" to their employees. For a fuller discussion
of the issues presented in Dole, see supra note 111.
161. Dole, 494 U.S. at 37.
162. Id. at 52 (White, J., dissenting).

163. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

25

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 8
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 58

4. Legislative History
In most instances, the Court's decision to apply Chevron turns on the
Court's analysis of a statute's legislative history. 64 In the Chemical
Manufacturers case, 6 ' the Court held that the agency's interpretation of a
regulatory provision was reasonable." As a result, the Court concluded
that deference was Yequired "unless the legislative history or the purpose and
structure of the statute clearly reveal a contrary intent." 67 The Court took
a similar position in Rust v. Sullivan, 68 concluding that deference is only
appropriate when "the legislative history is ambiguous and unenlightening on
the matters with respect to which the regulations deal .... t169
The Court's reliance on legislative history is fraught with difficulties.
The justices frequently differ about when it is proper to resort to such history.
For example, Justice Scalia has openly questioned the permissibility of using
legislative materials when the language of a statute is plain: "[I]f the language
of the statute is clear, that lanuage must be given effect-at least in the
absence of a patent absurdity.' 0 One commentator refers to this approach
as "the new textualism" which he defines as meaning that "once the Court has
ascertained a statute's plain meaning, consideration of legislative history
becomes irrelevant."'' But, as noted earlier, most justices are more willing
to use legislative materials.'

Even when the justices agree about the permissibility of using legislative
materials, they do not always agree about how to evaluate such materials. The
problem lies with the materials themselves. Although historical materials can

164. See, e.g., EEOC v. Commercial Office Prod. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115-16 (1988);
University of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589,594-99 (1988); DeBartolo
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574 (1988); ETSI
Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 514 (1988) ("the language, structure, and legislative
history of the Act fail to support the petitioners in this case"); Immigration & Naturalization
Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432-43 (1987); United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985) ("an agency may appropriately look to the legislative
history"); Chemical Mfr. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 126
(1985); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency
Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1256 (1989).
165. 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
166. Id. at 126.
167. Id.
168. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
169. Id. at 1768.
170. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
171. See Eskridge, supra note 92, at 623.
172. See text accompanying supra notes 92-98.
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be useful,'73 they can also be inaccurate 74 and misleading.'75 Judge
Kenneth Starr flatly stated, "It is well known that technocrats, lobbyists and
attorneys have created a virtual cottage industry in fashioning legislative
history so that the Congress will appear to embrace their particular view in a
given statute."' 76 Thus, "[1]egislative history ... has the potential to mute
(or indeed override) the voice of the statute itself. In terms of democratic
theory, the use of legislative history can distort the proper voice of each
branch of our constitutional government."' 77

173. See Pierce, supranote 164, at 1258 ("Sometimes statements in legislative history are
more reliable than statutory language because members of Congress are more familiar with a
committee or conference report than with the language of the statute.").
174. See Wald, supra note 73, at 200 (quoting Corry, supranote 94, at 631). She states:
As a former congressional liaison, I can verify many of the traditional
objections to profligate use of legislative history. Much of the pertinent legislative
discussion is unrecorded or inadequately recorded and thus only random fragments
are preserved. Often, what is said by the opponents of a proposed bill cannot be
trusted and many proponents-will not have read or understood the bill. Those who
do understand the bill may be impulsive and careless speakers, and the "cool heads"
may be more concerned with winning strategy than with giving a precise explanation
of what the bill means. As one scholar has said, "[t]he process of enacting new
legislation is not an intellectual exercise in pursuit of truth; it is an essay in
persuasion, or perhaps almost seduction!"
175. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290,318-19 (1897). The
Court stated:
[I]t is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon an act
by members of a legislative body that passed it by resorting to the speeches of
individual members thereof. Those who did not speak may not have agreed with
those who did; and those who spoke might differ from each other; the result being
that the only proper way to construe a legislative act is from the language used in
the act, and, upon occasion, by a resort to the history of the times when it was
passed.
Id. See also Pierce, supranote 164, at 1257. He argues:
Congress does not enact committee reports, hearings, or floor debates; it votes only
on bills with specific language. Statements in legislative history usually are
manufactured by some combination of lobbyists, staff members sympathetic to
special interests, and a few members of Congress sympathetic to those interests.
These participants in the legislative process usually plan statements of intent in
legislative history because they lack confidence that they could convince a majority
of Congress to reflect their preferences in statutory language.
Id. See generally Kenneth W. Starr, ObservationsAbout the Use of Legislative History, 1987
DuKE L.J. 371; Wald, supranote 73.
176. Starr, supra note 175, at 377. He goes on to note that, "[w]hile some aspects of this
occupation are legitimate, this history-making can also work an abuse ofthe legislative process."
Id.
177. Id. at 375. Starr further argues:
The enacted statute definitively represents the avowed "intent" of the Congress
as a whole. Legislative materials abound with records of the myriad of congressional "subdivisions"-subcommittees, committees, and ultimately
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The justices often resort to a variety of materials,'

none of which is

necessarily
conclusive and all of which may be subject to differing interpreta79
tions.'

There is some order to the process.

The justices seem to give

more weight to committee reports, conference committee reports, and

statements by floor managers.' 0 But committee reports do not always
82
exist,'

and the justices consider an array of other historical materials,

two-house conference committees. These records, however, at best can shed light
only on the "intent" of that small portion of Congress in which such records
originate; they therefore lack the holistic "intent" found in the statute itself. Thus,
although congressional committees are reservoirs of expertise and technical
knowledge, by the same token committees may be narrow and parochial in their
outlook, less balanced on the subject in question than the Congress as a whole,
Relying on extrastatutory materials therefore raises the danger that unrepresentative
materials will be accepted as authoritative.
Id.

178. See DiCKERSON, supra note 59, at 200 ("Academics complain that courts are
indiscriminate in their use of legislative materials-that they are scavengers rummaging through
'the ashcans of the legislative process."); see also Wald, supra note 73, at 195:
IlThe Court has greatly expanded the types of materials and events that it will
recognize in the search for congressional intent. Floor debates and hearings, for
example, are now routinely cited, as is evidence that the legislature did not act to
override or alter administrative or judicial interpretation at either the time of passage
or later.
179. Judge Abner Mikva offers the following story involving Representative Morris Udall's

passage of the strip-mining law:
Representative Udall fashioned a compromise and got it out of the committee
and onto the floor. At one point, in his effort to shepherd the compromise through
the House of Representatives, Udall, as a floor manager, was explaining why it was
a great bill and why it ought to be passed. One of the congressmen from West
Virginia, a strip-mining state, arose and asked if the gentleman from Arizona would

assure him that this bill would carefully protect states' rights and state sovereignty
and that the states would continue to perform their role in managing strip mining
within their borders. Representative Udall solemnly assured the gentleman that he
was absolutely correct, that the bill very carefully preserved the role of the states in

the process-state sovereignty was not impinged upon in any form. Twerlty minutes
later a pro-environmentalist congressman arose and asked if the gentleman from
Arizona would assure him that the bill, once and for all, set single standards for strip
mining and ensured that one federal law would cover strip mining throughout the
country. Representative Udall assured the gentleman that he was absolutely correct,
that this bill, once and for all, set uniform federal standards. Some of us were
sitting in the cloakroom during this exchange; when Representative Udall came out
for a drink of water one of the congressmen who had been listening in told him that
both positions could not be right. Udall then assured the gentleman that he was
absolutely. correct.
The Honorable Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to JudgeStarr'sObervations,1987 DuKE L.J. 380, 381.
180. Wald, supra note 73, at 201.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 202 ('The hornbook rule that hearings are relevant only as background to
show the purpose of the statute no longer holds. In many cases the best explanation of what the
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the usefulness of which vary from case-to-case.8
As a result, some
commentators have argued that historical materials encourage the Court to
engage in "high fiction in interpreting statutes."''
Judge Patricia Wald
concluded that, it "sometimes seem[s] that citing legislative history is still, as
my late colleague Harold Leventhal once observed, akin to 'looking over a
crowd and picking out your friends."" 5
These problems are evident in the Supreme Court's post-Chevron
deference decisions. 6 The justices often disagree about the implications to
be derived from a statute's legislative history.' In the ChemicalManufacturers case, 8 the majority concluded that it was obligated to defer to "the
Agency's view of the statute... unless the legislative history or the purpose
and structure of the statute clearly reveal a contrary intent on the part of
Congress."'8 9 Petitioner argued that the legislative materials evinced such
a contrary intent, and urged the Court to overturn that interpretation.' The
majority refused.'
Justice Marshall, joined by several other justices,
disagreed. He would have overturned the agency's interpretation based on the
Act's legislative history: "If I agreed with the Court's analysis of the statute
and the legislative history, I too would conclude that Chevron commands
deference to the administrative construction."'192
The Court often 'relies on historical materials in rejecting agency
interpretations. In University of Californiav. Public Employment Relations
Board,'93 the majority found, after examining a statute's language and
legislative history, that Congress had clearly expressed its intent. As a result,
they found it unnecessary to consider the agency's interpretation.'94 Justice
White, concurring, took exception to the holding. He argued that courts

legislation is about comes from the executive department or outside witnesses at the hearing.").
183. See id. at 201-02 ('The value of floor debate varies. Statements of sponsors or
managers of legislation are worthy of weight, but ad lib comments by marginal participants are
not.").
184. Starr, supra note 175, at 378.
185. Wald, supra note 73, at 214. She goes on to note that "consistent and uniform rules
for statutory construction and use of legislative materials are not being followed today." Id.
186. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 647-50 (1990)
(discussing legislative history of Act at some length); Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494
U.S. 26, 34-40 (1990); EEOC v. Commercial Office Prod. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 121-22 (1988);
University of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589, 594-99 (1988);
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 43243 (1987); see
generally Marshall J. Breger, IntroductoryRemarks-Conference on Statutory Interpretation,
1987 DuKE L.J. 362; Mikva, supra note 179; Starr, supranote 175, at 378.
187. See, e.g., Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992).
188. 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
189. Id. at 126.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 152 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
193. 485 U.S. 589 (1988).
194. Id. at 594-99.
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should rely on legislative histories in only limited situations: "Where the
statute itself is not determinative and is open to more than one construction,
the legislative history must be quite clear if it is to foreclose the agency's
construction as expressed in its regulations, which is surely not the case
here."' 95 He concluded that the agency's interpretation was entitled to
deference.' 96
IrBetts, the justices again disagreed about the conclusions to be drawn
from historical materials. The majority felt that the legislative history
supported its interpretation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and
therefore rejected the EEOC's interpretation of that Act.' 97 Justice Marshall,
joined by Justice Brennan, would have deferred to the agency's interpretation.
In their view, the Act's history "convincingly support[ed] the holistic reading"
Likewise, in Communications Workers of
adopted by the agency. 9
Justice
America v. Beck,'" the majority rejected an interpretation.
Blackmun, joined by Justices Scalia and O'Connor, chastised the majority:
Under our settled doctrines of statutory construction, were there any
ambiguity in the meaning of § 8(a)(3)-which there is not-the Court
would be constrained to defer to the interpretation of the NLRB, unless the
agency's construction were contrary to the clear intent of Congress ....
Although the Court apparently finds such ambiguity, it fails to apply this
doctrine. By reference to a narrow view of congressional "purpose" gleaned
from isolated statements in the legislative history, and in reliance upon this
Court's interpretation of another statute, the Court constructs an interpretation that not only finds no support in the statutory language or legislative
history of § 8(a)(3), but also contradicts the Board's settled interpretation
of the statutory provision. The Court previously has directed: "Where the
Board's construction of the Act is reasonable, it should not be rejected
'merely because the courts might prefer another view ofthe statute."' Here,
the only apparent motivation for holding that the Board's interpretation of
§ 8(a)(3) is impermissible, is the Court's view of anotherstatute."'

195. Id. at 603 (White, J., dissenting).

196. Justice White stated:
Inquiry into that history may lead a court to conclude that the agency's
interpretation is not only permissible but is also the only acceptable construction of
the law. But even on the majority's own description of the statutory background,
I am unable to conclude that the agency could not have adopted, and could not now
adopt, a view of the exceptions that would, on the facts of this case, have reflected
the views urged by appellees, particularly with respect to the private mail exception.
Id. at 603-04.
197. Public Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 178-80 (1989).
198. Id. at 189 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
199. 487 U.S. 735, cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988).
200. Id. at 768 (quoting Pattern Makers League of N. Am. v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 114
(1985), quoting Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss1/8
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5. Canons of Construction
The justices have also been willing to invoke the canons of construction
in applying Chevron."' These canons serve a variety of purposes. Some
canons have nothing to do with actual intent, but provide that statutes should
be construed in particular ways: strictly, 0 2 liberally,2"3 or in accordance
Other canons are supposed to reflect
with certain other principles.2"

201. See, e.g., Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26,36 (1990) ("The traditional
canon of construction, noscitura sociis, dictates that "'words grouped in a list should be given
related meaning."') (quoting Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 114-15 (1989), quoting
Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)).
202. See, e.g., University of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589, 604
dissenting); M. Kraus & Bros., Inc. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 621
(1988) (Stevens, J.,
(1946) (provisions that impose criminal sanctions should be strictly construed).
203. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449
(1987) (lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes should be construed in favor of the alien);
Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 645 F.2d 360, 383 (5th Cir. 1981)
(regulatory provisions should be liberally construed to effectuate their purposes), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1142 (1982).
204. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 11l S. Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991) (unless a
contrary intent appears, congressional legislation is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 111
S. Ct. 1156, 1163 (1991) ("repeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute
are strongly disfavored") (quoting United States v. Philadephia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350
(1963)); DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
575 (1988) ("where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress") (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 499-501 (1979)); Traynor v. Tumage, 485 U.S. 535, 548 (1988) (A
statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted
statute covering a more generalized spectrum unless the later statute expressly contradicts the
original act or is absolutely necessary for the words of the later statute to have any meaning at
all); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44 (When Congress has been silent or ambiguous with respect to
an interpretive issue, courts should defer to the interpretation of the agency responsible for
administration of the statute.).
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language patterns,"' and therefore may assist a court in discovering actual
legislative intent."0
In this century, many commentators have criticized the canons.0 7 As
Judge Posner recognized, "to exaggerate slightly, it has been many years since
any legal scholar has had a good word to say about any but one or two of the
canons."20 8 Some argue that particular canons are wrong or misleading.20 9
Others argue that the canons conflict. Karl Llewellyn once asserted that the
canons come in inconsistent pairs.21 0 To prove his point, Llewellyn matched
twenty-eight canons in one column against their opposites in a second
column.
205. See, e.g., Norfolk, 111 S. Ct. at 1163 ("when a general term follows a specific one, the
general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with specific
enumeration"); Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 36-37 (1990) (Court applied
noscitura sociis which dictates that "words grouped in a list should be given related meaning",
and it also applied the canon which states that a court should not be guided by a single sentence
or member of a sentence, but should look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object
and policy); Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 431-32 (1987) ("where Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion," and the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used,

and there is a strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it uses.)
(quoting United States v. Wong Kim.Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972).
206. See DICKERsON, supra note 59, at 228.
207. Wald, supra note 73, at 215 ("[W]e recognize the fallacy of generalities and absolute
rules of construction.").
208. Richard A. Posner, StatutoryInterpretation-Inthe Classroom and in the Courtroom,
50 U. CHt. L. REv. 800, 805 (1983).
209. Radin disliked the expressio unius canon:
The rule that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other is in direct
contradiction to the habits of speech of most persons. To say that all men are mortal
does not mean that all women are not, or that all other animals are not. There is no
such implication, either in usage or in logic, unless there is a very particular
emphasis on the word men. It is neither customary nor convenient to indicate such
emphasis in statutes, and without this indication, the first comment on the rule is that
it is not true.
Radin, supra note 60, at 873-74. He also disliked the ejusdem generisrule. Id. at 874-75; see
also Frederick J. De Sloovere, ExtrinsicAids in the Interpretationof Statutes, 88 U. PA. L. REV.
527, 528-29 (1940); Quintin Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of StatutoryInterpretation,
3 KAN. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1954); Landis, supra note 60, at 892.
210. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
CanonsAbout How Statutes Are to Be Construed,3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
211. Included were the following pairs:
THRUST

1. A statute cannot go beyond
its text.
...
2. Statutes in derogation of
common law will not be
extended by construction,

PARRY

1. To effect its purpose[,] a
statute may be implemented beyond its
text.
2. Such acts will be the
liberally construed if their
nature is remedial.
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Nevertheless, the Court continues to use the canons.2" 2 It does so, in

part, because many of them have value.213 As Justice Frankfurter recognized, "[i]nsofar as canons of construction are generalizations of experience,
they all have worth."2 '4 Of course, the canons rarely drive decisionmaking,
and they must be applied with discretion. Frankfurter went on to argue that
"[d]ifficulties emerge when canons compete in soliciting judgment, because
they conflict rather than converge. For the demands of judgment underlying
the art of interpretation, there is no vade-mecum."" 5

24. Punctuation will govern
when a statute is open to two

7. Remedial statutes are to be
liberally construed and if a
retroactive interpretation
will promote the ends of
justice, they should receive
such construction.
8. Courts have the power to
inquire into real-as
distinct from ostensiblepurpose.
24. Punctuation marks will not
control the plain and evident

constructions.

meaning of language.

7. A statute imposing a new
penalty or forfeiture, or a
new liability or disability,
or creating a new right of
action will not be construed
as having a retroactive effect.
8. Where design has been
distinctly stated no place
is left for construction.

25. "And" and "or" may be read
25. It must be assumed that
interchangeably whenever the due
language has been chosen with
change is necessary to give propriety
regard to grammatical
the statute sense and effect.
and is not interchangeable
on mere conjecture.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
212. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759 (1991); DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (According to the Court, the
"elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a
statute from unconstitutionality.") (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)).
213. In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1238 (1991), Justice Marshall
referred to certain canons which he described as "clear statement" rules. He described these rules
as follows:
Clear-statement rules operate less to reveal actualcongressional intent than to shield
important values from an insufficientlystronglegislative intent to displace them. ...
When they apply, such rules foreclose inquiry into extrinsic guides to interpretation,
.. , and even compel courts to select less plausible candidates from within the
range of permissible constructions.
Id. In the Arabian American case, the Court had applied the following rule which states that,
unless a contrary intent appears, congressional legislation is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Id. at 1230. Justice Marshall concluded that this was
not a clear statement rule.
214. Frankfurter, supra note 62, at 544.
215. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

33

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 8

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

162

[Vol. 58

In its post-Chevron deference-decisions, the Court has invoked a variety
of canons including the following:
1. If the language of a statute is clear, that language must be given
effect-at least in the absence of a patent absurdity. 6
2. Going behind the plain language of a statute, in search of a possibly
contrary congressional intent, is a step to be taken cautiously even under the
best of circumstances.217
a sociis, words
3. Under the traditional canon of construction, noscitur
218
grouped in a list should be given related meaning.
4. In expounding a statute, a court should not be guided by a single
sentence or member of a sentence, but should look to the provisions of the
whole law, and to its object and policy.2 9
in deportation statutes should be construed in
5. Lingering ambiguities
22 °
favor of the alien.
6. Before deference will be given, the Court must first determine22 whether
the agency's interpretation is consistent with its prior decisions. 1
7. Once a Court has determined a statute's clear meaning, it should adhere
to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and judge an
against the court's prior
agency's later interpretation of the statute
2
determination of the statute's meaning.=
The Court has also applied other canons.'

Indeed, the Chevron decision

216. See, e.g., Immigration &Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,452
(Scalia, J., concurring).
217. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 553 (1987) (quoting
United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95-96 (1985)).
218. Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S 26, 36 (1990).
219. Id. at 35 (citing Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989)).
220. Cardoza-Fonseca,408 U.S. at 449.
221. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 847 (1992).
222. Id. at 847-48 (quoting Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Stell, Inc., 497 U.S. 116,

131 (1990)).
223. These canons of statutory construction include:
8. It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a statute dealing with a
narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute
covering a more generalized spectrum. Traynor v. Tumage, 485 U.S. 535, 547-48
(1988) (quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976)).
9. [Sometimes, as an addendum to the prior canon, the Court states the following
proviso] unless the later statute expressly contradicts the original act or is absolutely
necessary for the words of the later statute to have meaning. Id. at 548.
10. The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional
enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the
courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard
each as effective. Id. (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
11. Where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, a court should construe the statute to avoid such problems
unless such intention is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress. DeBartolo Corp.
v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
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provides its own canon: "When Congress has been silent or ambiguous with
respect to an interpretive issue, courts should defer to the interpretation of the
agency responsible for administration of the statute."'2 4
In its post-Chevron decision in Norfolk & Western Railway v. American
Train DispatchersAss'n,' the Court affirmed an agency's interpretation as
correct." But it did so only after analyzing various canons of construction.
The Court began by noting that the rule of ejusdem generis seemed applicable.'27 This rule provides that "when a general term follows a specific one,
the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the
one with specific enumeration."'2s The Court refused to invoke the canon
noting that it "does not control, however, when the whole context dictates a
different conclusion."'2 The Court then reached a conclusion inconsistent
with the canon,' ° and it did so by invoking another canon of construction:

12. When a general term follows a specific one, the general term should be
understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration.
Norfolk & W. Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1156, 1163

(1991).
13. When Congress includes particular language inone section of a statute but omits
it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. at 432 (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23
(1983), quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720,722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
14. A court should assume that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary
meaning of the words used. Id.at 431 (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv.
v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984), quoting American Tobacco Co. v.
Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982), quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1,

9 (1962)).
15. There is a strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the
language it uses. Id. at 432 n.12.
16. Repeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute are
strongly disfavored. Norfolk & W.Ry., 111 S.Ct. at 1163 (quoting United States
v. Philadephia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350 (1963)).
17. Unless a contrary intent appears, we assume that Congress intends for legislation
to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S.Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991).
224. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45.

225. 111 S.Ct. 1156 (1991).
226. Id. at 1166.

227. The Court noted:
By itself, the phrase "all other law" indicates no limitation. The circumstances
that the phrase "all other law" is in addition to coverage for "the antitrust laws" does
not detract from this breadth. There is a canon of statutory construction which, on
first impression, might seem to dictate a different result.

Id.
228. Id. at 1163.

229. Id.
230. Id. ("[tihere are several reasons the immunity provision cannot be interpreted to apply
only to antitrust laws and similar statutes.").

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

35

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 8
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 58

"'Repeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute are
strongly disfavored." ' '
In several cases, the Court has used canons to displace the Chevron
doctrine. In DeBartoloCorp. v. FloridaGulf Coast Building & Construction
Trades Council,"' 2 the Court cited Chevron and noted that the NLRB's
interpretation "would normally'be entitled to deference unless that construction
were clearly contrary to the intent of Congress."'23 But the Court concluded
that "[a]nother rule of statutory construction ... is pertinent here.' 4
According to the Court, "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress."'2 s The Court concluded that the agency's
interpretation posed serious questions under the First Amendment." As a
result, the Court decided to "independently determine whether there is another
interpretation, not raising these serious constitutional concerns, that may fairly
be ascribed to § 8(b)(4)(ii)."''" Finding such an interpretation, the Court
refused to defer to the agency. 8
Likewise, in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. CardozaFonseca, 9 the Court refused to defer to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service's (INS) interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA). 24 Instead the Court interpreted the Act itself, by resorting to general
principles of statutory construction.24' It invoked one of the canons of
construction: "'[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section
of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress' acts
intentionally and purposefully in the disparate
42
inclusion or exclusion. 0

231. Id. (quoting United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350 (1963)).

232. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
233. Id. at 574.
234. Id. at 575.

235. Id.
236. The Court stated in full:
We agree with the Court of Appeals and respondents that this case calls for the
invocation of the Catholic Bishop rule, for the Board's construction of the statute,
as applied in this case, poses serious questions of the validity of§ 8(b)(4) under the
First Amendment....
mhe Court of Appeals was plainly correct in holding that the Board's
construction would require deciding serious constitutional issues.

Id. at 575-76.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 577.

239. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
240. See infra text accompanying notes 251-64 for a fuller discussion of the issues before
the Court.
241. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 431-32.
242. Id. at 432 (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983), quoting United
States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
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As one might expect, the justices do not always agree regarding the
application of the various canons. Rust v. Sullivan243 involved the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulation prohibiting recipients
of funds under Title X of the Public Health Service Act from engaging in
abortion counseling, referral, and activities advocating abortion as methods of
family planning. Petitioners argued that the regulations "must be invalidated
because they raise serious questions of constitutional law."2' In resolving
this issue, the Court discussed various related canons of construction.245
The Court concluded that the Secretary's regulations did not present "the
sort of 'grave and doubtful constitutional questions,'... that would lead...
[us] to assume Congress did not intend to authorize their issuance,"246 and
so the Court refused to invalidate the agency's regulations in order to save the
statute from unconstitutionality.247

243. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
244. Id. at 1771.
245. The Court stated:
[Petitioners] rely on EdwardJ.DebartoloCorp.v. FloridaGulfCoast Building and
Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 108 S. Ct. 1392, 99 L.Ed.2d 645
(1988), and NLRB v. CatholicBishop of Chicago,440 U.S. 490, 99 S. Ct. 1313, 59

L. Ed. 2d 533 (1979), which hold that "an Act of Congress ought not to be
construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible construction remains
available. Id. at 5. Under this canon of statutory construction, "[tihe elementary
rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to in order to save a
statute from unconstitutionality." Debartolo Corp., supra,485 U.S., at 575, 108 S.
Ct., at 1397 (emphasis added) quoting Hooperv. California,155 U.S. 648, 657, 15
S. Ct. 207, 211, 39 L. Ed. 297 (1895).
The principle enunciated in Hooperv.California,supra,and subsequent cases,
is a categorical one: "as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of
which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt
that which will save the Act." Blodgettv. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148, 48 S. Ct. 105,
107, 72 L. Ed. 206 (1927) (opinion of Holmes, J.). This principle is based at least
in part on the fact that a decision to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional "is
the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform." Id.
Following Hooper,supra,cases such as United Statesv. DelawareandHudson Co.,
213 U.S. 366, 408, 29 S. Ct. 527, 535, 53 L. Ed. 836, and UnitedStates v. Jin Fuey
Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401, 36 S. Ct. 658, 659, 60 L. Ed. 1061, developed the
corollary doctrine that "[a] statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to
avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon
that score." Jin Fuey Moy, supra,at 401, 36 S. CL, at 659. This canon is followed
out of respect for Congress, which we assume legislates in the light of constitutional
limitations. FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-07, 44 S. Ct. 336,
337, 68 L. Ed. 696 (1924). It is qualified by the proposition that "avoidance of a
difficulty will not be pressed to the point of disingenuous evasion." Moore Ice
Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379, 53 S. Ct. 620, 622, 77 L. Ed. 1265 (1933).
Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1771.
246. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1771 (quoting United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S.
366, 408 (1904)).
247. Id.
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Mr. Justice Blackmun, joined by three other justices, vigorously
disagreed:
Casting aside established principles of statutory construction and
administrative jurisprudence, the majority in these cases today unnecessarily
passes upon important questions of constitutional law ....
The majority does not dispute that "[flederal statutes are to be so
construed as to avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality." Machinists
v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 1790, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1141 (1961)
....Nor does the majority deny that this principle is fully applicable to
cases such as the instant one, in which a plausible but constitutionally
suspect statutory interpretation is embodied in an administrative regulation
Rather in its zeal to address the constitutional issues, the majority
sidesteps this established canon of construction with the feeble excuse that
the challenged regulations "do not raise the sort of 'grave and doubtful
constitutional questions,'... that would lead us to assume Congress did not
intend to authoiAze their issuance." Ante, at 1771, quoting UnitedStates v.
Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909).

This facile response to the intractable problem the Court addresses
today is disingenuous at best. Whether or not one believes that these
Regulations are valid, it avoids reality to contend that they do not give rise
to serious constitutional questions. The canon is applicable to this case not
because "it was likely that [the Regulations] ...would be challenged on

constitutional grounds," ante, at 1771, but because the question squarely
presented by the Regulations-the extent to which the Government may
attach an otherwise unconstitutional condition to the receipt of a public
benefit-implicates a troubled area of our jurisprudence in which a court
ought not entangle itself unnecessarily ....

6. Implying Intent
In at least one instance, a justice has been willing to forge beyond the
"traditional tools" of statutory constuction, and to "infer" congressional intent
based on his own conception of policy. In Rust, dissenting Justice Stevens
argued that Chevron deference was inappropriate. He noted that "[i]n a
society that abhors censorship and in which policymakers have traditionally
placed the highest value on the freedom to communicate, it is unrealistic to
conclude that statutory authority to regulate conduct implicitly authorized the
Executive to regulate speech." 49 He concluded: "Because I am convinced

that the 1970 Act did not authorize the Secretary to censor the speech of grant
recipients or their employees, I would hold the challenged
regulations invalid
250
and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals."

248. Id. at 1778-79 (citations omitted).
249. Id. at 1788.
250. Id.
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III. CHEVRON AVOIDED
In the aforementioned cases, the Court invoked principles of statutory

construction, and used them to hold that the requirements for deference were
not satisfied. In the cases discussed below, the Court took a different
approach: it declared Chevron inapplicable. Thus, the Court held that even
though a statute may be silent or ambiguous, and even though the agency's
interpretation may be reasonable, deference is not required.
A. Pure Questions of Statutory Construction
51
In Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
the
Court displaced Chevron by holding that it need not defer when presented
only with "pure questions of statutory construction." 2 In Cardoza-Fonseca,
the Court rejected the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS)
interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).2 13 The Court

acknowledged that Congress had given the INS responsibility for administering the INA, and for "filling "'any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by
Congress. ' 054 But, even though the Court concluded that there was "some
ambiguity" in the INA,' 5 the Court refused to defer concluding that the case
involved a narrower task that was "well within the province of the judicia-

ry.,

2 56

The basis for the Court's decision was not entirely clear. The Court
suggested that ordinarily, it would have deferred to the INS's interpretation.
But the Court concluded that Cardoza-Fonseca involved a dispute about
whether two legal standards meant the same thing, 7 and the Court viewed

251. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
252. Id. at 446. In a pre-Chevron case, Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1
(1977), the Supreme Court held that it need not defer to the Securities and Exchange
Commission's determination that a private right of action should be implied under the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934. The Supreme Court noted that the matter was a "narrow one for
judicial resolution":
Even if the agency spoke with a consistent voice, however, its presumed "expertise"
in the securities-law field is of limited value when the narrow legal issue is one
peculiarly reserved for judicial resolution, namely whether a cause of action should
be implied by judicial interpretation in favor of a particular class of litigants.
Indeed, in our prior cases relating to implied causes of action, the Court has
understandably not invoked the "administrative deference" rule, even when the SEC
supported the result reached in the particular case .... That rule is more appropriately applicable in instances where, unlike here, an agency has rendered binding,
consistent, official interpretations of its statute over a long period of time ....
Id. at 41 n.27.
253. For further discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 239-42.
254. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 448.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. The INA provides two methods by which an alien can avoid deportation. Under
§ 208(a), an alien who can demonstrate a "well founded fear of persecution" if forced to return
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this issue as a "narrow legal question. '' 1 8 In the Court's view, deference is
only necessary when "the agency is required to apply either or both standards
to a particular set of facts," 9 and "narrow legal questions" did not require
such application.
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White,
dissented. Justice Powell argued that the Court should have deferred to the
INS's conclusions:
The Attorney General has delegated the responsibility for making these
determinations to the BIA. That Board has examined more of these cases
than any court ever has or can. It has made a considered judgment that the
difference between the "well-founded" and the "clear probability" standard
is of no practical import: that is, the evidence presented in asylum and
withholding of deportation cases rarely, if ever, will meet one of these
standards without meeting both. This is just the type of expert judgment-formed by the entity to whom Congress has committed the
question-to which we should defer. 2 °
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, castigated the Court for its
discussion of Chevron. In his view, there was no need to discuss Chevron

because "the INS's interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the plain
meaning" of the statutory language and the INA's structure.261 Moreover,
he felt that the Court's treatment of Chevron was wrong. He termed the
Court's "use of this superfluous discussion" as having expressed "controversial" and "erroneous... views on the meaning of this Court's decision in
Chevron., 61 In his view, Chevron held that "courts must give effect to a
reasonable agency interpretation of a statute unless that interpretation is
inconsistent with a clearly expressed congressional intent.0 63 He flatly
rejected the Court's conclusion that it should decide "a pure question of

statutory construction."'

to the country of his nationality must be granted refugee status. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982). In
addition, deportation can be avoided under § 243(h) by aliens who show that their "life or
freedom would be threatened" if they are forced to return to their country of nationality. 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h)(i) (1982). The INS, as well as the courts, had interpreted § 243(h) to require
aliens to show that it was "more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution."
Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 423. .The INS decided to apply the same standard to § 208(a)
arguing that there is no difference between a "well founded fear" standard and a "would be
threatened" standard." Id. at 425. In Cardoza-Fonseca,the Court disagreed and rejected the
agency's interpretation.
258. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 448.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 460.
261, Id. at 453.
262. Id. at 453-54.
263. Id. at 454.
264. Id. According to Justice Scalia:
Mhe Court's discussion is flatly inconsistentwith this well-established interpretation
[that deference is required]. The Court first implies that courts may substitute their
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B. EEOC Cases
In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,265 the Court placed another
gloss on Chevron. In ArabianAmerican, the Court refused to apply Chevron
to interpretive statements made by the EEOC in a compliance manual. 2"
The manual was supported by testimony from ihe EEOC's Chairman, an
adjudicative decision and a letter by the Chairman. The Court concluded that
Chevron deference was inappropriate because of the nature of the EEOC's
powers: "'Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not confer upon the EEOC
authority to promulgate rules or regulations. 't 2 67 The Court concluded that
only Skidmore deference should apply2 6 and ultimately rejected the EEOC's
interpretation noting that it was unpersuasive.269

interpretation of a statute for that of an agency whenever, "[e]mploying traditional
tools of statutory construction," they are able to reach a conclusion as to the proper
interpretation of the statute. But this approach would make deference a doctrine of
desperation, authorizing courts to defer only if they would otherwise be unable to
construe the enactment at issue. This is not an interpretation but an evisceration of
Chevron.
The Court also implies that courts may substitute their interpretation of a
statute for that of an agency whenever they face "a pure question of statutory
construction for the courts to decide," rather than a "question of interpretation [in
which] the agency is required to apply [a legal standard] to a particular set of facts."
No support is adduced for this proposition, which is contradicted by the case the
Court purports to be interpreting, since in Chevron the Court deferred to the
Environmental Protection Agency's abstract interpretation of the phrase "stationary
source."
In my view, the Court badly misinterprets Chevron. More fundamentally,
however, I neither share nor understand the Court's eagerness to refashion important
principles of administrative law in a case in which such questions are completely
unnecessary to the decision and have not been fully briefed by the parties.
Id. at 454-55 (citations omitted).
265. 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1235 (1991).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1235.
268. Id.
269. Id. The Court stated:
The EEOC's interpretation does not fare well under these standards. As an
initial matter, the position taken by the Commission "contradicts the position which
[it] had enunciated at an earlier date, closer to the enactment of the governing
statute." The EEOC offers no basis in its experience for the change. The EEOC's
interpretation of the statute here thus has been neither contemporaneous with its
enactment nor consistent since the statute came into law. As discussed above, it also
lacks support in the plain language of the statute. While we do not wholly discount
the weight to be given to the 1988 guideline, its persuasive value is limited when
judged by the standards set forth in Skidmore. We are of the view that, even when
considered in combination with petitioners' other arguments, the EEOC's interpretation is insufficiently weighty to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial

application.
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Justice Scalia concurred in the result, but took issue with the Court's
construction of Chevron." He construed Arabian American as holding only
that, because the EEOC lacked rulemaking power, its interpretations were not
entitled to Chevron deference. Thus, if the EEOC had held such power, its
interpretations would have been entitled to deference. Justice Scalia viewed
this distinction as ill-conceived.27 He argued that the Court's distinction
between "legislative rules" and "other action" was an "anachronism" "in an era
2 2 He
when our treatment of agency positions is governed by Chevron.""
noted that, in its prior holding in EEOC v. Commercial Office Products
Co.,273 the Court had flatly stated that "the EEOC's interpretation of
ambiguous language need only be reasonable to be entitled to deference."274
He concluded by suggesting
that the Court's present decision left the state of
27
the law "unsettled.
The CommercialOffice Productscase dealt with the meaning of the word
"terminate" in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 6 The EEOC, the agency
responsible for enforcing the Act, had previously interpreted the provision.
At the beginning of his majority opinion, Justice Marshall flatly stated that the
EEOC's interpretation of the Civil Rights laws was entitled to deference: "It
is axiomatic that the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII, for which it has
primary enforcement responsibility, need not be the best one by grammatical
or any other standards. Rather, the EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous
language need only be reasonable to be entitled to deference. '" 77 Justice
Marshall found that the EEOC's interpretation was, in fact, reasonable: "The
reasonableness of the EEOC's interpretation of 'terminate' in its statutory
context is more than amply supported by the legislative history of Title VII's

Id. (citations omitted).
270. Id. at 1236.
271. Id. According to Justice Scalia,
The case relied upon for the proposition that the EEOC's interpretations have only
the force derived from their "power to persuade" was decided in an era when we
were disposed to give deference (as opposed to "persuasive force") only to so-called
"legislative regulations." The reasoning of GeneralElectricCo. v. Gilbert,429 U.S.

125 (1976) was not that the EEOC (singled out from other agencies) was not entitled
to deference, but that the EEOC's guidelines, like the guidelines of all agencies

without explicit rulemaling power, could not be considered legislative rules and
therefore could not be accorded deference.
In an era when our treatment of agency positions is governed by Chevron, the
"legislative rules vs. other action" dichotomy of Gilbert is an anachronism and it is
not even a correct description of that anachronism to say that Gilbert held that the
EEOC (as opposed to all agency action other than legislative rules) is not entitled
to deference.

Id. (citations omitted).
272. Id.

273. 486 U.S. 107 (1988).
274. Id. at 115.
275. Arabian Am. Oil, 111 S. Ct. at 1236.
276. 42 U.S.C. § 706(c) (1982).
277. Commercial Office Products,486 U.S. at 115.
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deferral provisions, the purposes of those provisions, and the language of other
sections of the Act, as described in detail below. Deference is therefore
appropriate."2 " As a result, the Court decided to defer.279 Interestingly,

not a single justice suggested that Chevron should not be applied to EEOC
interpretations.
C. Inconsistency With PriorJudicialDecisions
The Court has also avoided Chevron by holding that deference is not
required when an agency's interpretation conflicts with the Court's prior
decisions. In a case decided just last year, Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,"1 the
Court used this principle to reject an administrative interpretation. The case
involved the question of whether a company could preclude union organizers
from entering the company's parking lot to place handbills on the windshields
of employee cars. The employer denied the organizers access to the lot. The
employer did allow the organizers to distribute handbills from a grassy strip,
as well as to picket from that same area. In addition, the organizers were able
to directly contact some twenty percent of the employees. The NLRB had
held that, in denying union organizers access to its lot, the employer had
engaged in an unfair labor practice prohibited by the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA).
In Lechmere, the Court rejected the NLRB's interpretation. Justice
Thomas, writing for the majority, began by stating, "Before we reach any
issue of deference to the Board, we must first determine whether Jean
Country-at least as applied to nonemployee organizational trespassing-is
consistent with our past interpretation of § 7.2" He justified this position
by noting, "'Once we have determined a statute's clear meaning, we adhere
to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and judge an agency's
later interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of the

278. Id. at 115-16.
279. The majority viewed the agency's interpretation as follows:
To be sure, "terminate" also may bear the meaning proposed by respondent.
Indeed, it may bear that meaning more naturally or more frequently in common
usage. But it is axiomatic that the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII, for which it
has primary enforcement responsibility, need not be the best one by grammatical or
any other standards. Rather, the EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous language need
only be reasonable to be entitled to deference ....

The reasonableness of the

EEOC's interpretation of "terminate" in its statutory context is more than amply
supported by the legislative history of the deferral provisions of Title VII, the
purposes of those provisions, and the language of other sections of the Act, as
described in detail below. Deference is therefore appropriate.

Id.
280. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, felt that the majority's
decision was inconsistent with the statute's "plain language." Id. at 126. Justice O'Connor
concurred but disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the agency's interpretation was "the
only one permissible." Id. at 125.
281. 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
282. Id. at 847.
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statute's meaning."'283 Finding that the agency's interpretation conflicted
with the Court's prior interpretation, the Court refused to defer.
Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, dissented. They argued that
the Board's interpretation was entitled to deference "'so long as it [was]
rational and consistent with the Act, ... even if [the Court] would have
formulated a different rule had [it] sat on the Board.' 284 They argued that
the Court's role was "narrow": "The Board's application of the rule, if

substantial evidence on the record as a whole, must be
supported 2 8by
5
enforced.
The Court has refused to defer in other cases on similar grounds. In its
recent decision in Presley v. Etowah County Commission,286 the Court first
interpreted the statute in question. Only after the Court had reached its own
conclusions regarding the statute's meaning and only after taking into account
its prior decisions, did the Court turn its attention to the agency's interpretation. Finding that the agency's interpretation conflicted with the Court's
position, the Court rejected the agency's position. Similarly, in Maislin
Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 7 the Court rejected an
that "[flor a century," the Court
administrative interpretation holding
288
interpreted the statute differently.
Justice White, dissenting in Lechmere, argued that the Court's decision
seemed inconsistent with Chevron and some of the Court's later decisions. He
argued that, if the prior interpretation had been rendered by the Board rather
than by the Court, the Board would have been free to change its interpreta-

283. Id. at 847-48 (quoting Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116,
131 (1990)).
284. Id. at 850 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.,
494 U.S. 775, 787 (1990)).
285. Id.
286. 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992).
287. 497 U.S. 116 (1990).
288. Id. at 130-31.
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tion.289 He wondered why the Board should not be similarly free to alter the
Court's interpretation. 2r
Justice White based his argument on several post-Chevron decisions
which suggested that, if an interpretive question involves a policy choice, then
the agency responsible for the regulatory scheme should be free to make that
choice. He also based his argument on decisions like Chevron, which had
held that regulatory interpretations were not binding.29 Thus, if an agency
makes a policy choice and later determines that its choice was ill-advised, the
agency is free to make a different choice (provided, of course, that it offers
a reasoned explanation for its change of position).2'
In Rust v.
Sullivan,293 for example, the Court stated that "[t]his Court has rejected the
argument that an agency's interpretation 'is not entitled to deference because
it represents a sharp break with prior interpretations' of the statute in
question.1"294 The Court went on to state that "'[a]n initial agency interpreta-

289. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 853 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White stated:
Had a case like Babcock been first presented for decision under the law
governing in 1991, I am quite sure that we would have deferred to the Board, or at
least attempted to find sounder ground for not doing so. Furthermore, had the Board
ruled that third parties must be treated differently than employees and held them to
the standard that the Court now says Babcock mandated, it is clear enough that we
also would have accepted that construction of the statute. But it is also clear, at least
to me, that if the Board later reworked that rule in the manner of Jean Country,we
would also accept the Board's change of mind ....
As it is, the Court's decision fails to recognize that Babcock is at odds with
the current law of deference to administrative agencies and compounds that error by
adopting the substantive approach Babcock applied lock, stock and barrel. And
unnecessarily so, for, as indicated above, Babcock certainly does not require the
reading the Court gives it today, and in any event later cases have put a gloss on
Babcock that the Court should recognize.
Id.

290. Id.
291. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1769 (1991). In Chevron, the Court
stated:
The fact that the agency has from time to time changed its interpretation of the term
"source" does not, as respondents argue, lead us to conclude that no deference should
be accorded the agency's interpretation of the statute. An initial agency interpreta-

tion is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency, to engage in
informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its
policy on a continuing basis. Moreover, the fact that the agency has adopted
different definitions in different contexts adds force to the argument that the
definition itself is flexible, particularly since Congress has never indicated any
disapproval of a flexible reading of the statute.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64.
292. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1769.

293. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
294. Id. at 1769 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862). The Court goes on to state:
In Chevron, we held that a revised interpretation deserves deference because "[a]n
initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone" and "the agency, to
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tion is not carved in stone."'295 An agency is not required to 'establish rules
of conduct to last forever,' but rather must be allowed to "adapt its rules and
policies to the demands of changing circumstances." '96
IV. CONCLUSION

As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the Supreme Court does not apply
Chevron in a routine or mechanical way. The Court examines a statute's
language, purpose, structure, and legislative history. The Court also uses

various canons of construction. As a result, in order for an administrative
interpretation to receive Chevron deference, it must survive an involved
process of judicial review. Many interpretations perish during that process.
The Court finds that Congress has not been silent or ambiguous with respect
to an interpretive issue" or it rejects the agency's interpretation as
unreasonable. 29 8

engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the
wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis. An agency is not required "'to establish
rules of conduct to last forever,"'.. . but rather "must be given ample latitude to
adapt [its] rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances."'
Id. (citations omitted). The Court concluded that "the Secretary amply justified his change of
interpretation with a 'reasoned analysis."' Id.; see also Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 111
S. Ct. 2524, 2535 (1991).
295. Rust, III S. Ct. at 1769 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64).
296. Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983);
see also Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 1769 (1991) ("We find that the Secretary amply
justified his change of interpretation with a "reasoned analysis.").
297. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.0 (If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that
intention is the law and must be given effect."); accord Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV
Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 648 (1990); University of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 485
U.S. 589, 602 (1988) (White, J., concurring); NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers,
484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987); see also Anthony, supra note 5, at 18.
298. In Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990), the Court concluded that the agency's
interpretation was "'manifestly contrary to the statute"' and therefore exceeded its authority. Id.
at 541 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844). Justice White, joined by the ChiefJustice, disagreed.
Id. at 541-48. After engaging in extensive analysis, he stated: "In sum, because I cannot
conclude that the Secretary's method for evaluating child-disability claims is an impermissible
construction of the Act, I dissent." Id. at 548.
Similarly, in Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478 (1990), the majority concluded that the
agency's interpretation was reasonable:
"Since the Secretary's interpretation of the
§ 602(a)(8)(A)(vi) disregard rule incorporates the definition of'child support' that we find plain
on the face of the statute, our statutory inquiry is at end." Id. at 485. Three justices, led by
Justice Blackmun, disagreed: "Since the Secretary's interpretation of the § 602(a)(8)(A)(vi)
disregard is not compelled by the language of the statute, and is not supported by its purpose and
legislative history, it is not entitled to deference and should be rejected by this Court." Id. at
493. At the beginning of his dissent, Justice Blackmun noted:
Today the Court holds that the plain language of a statute applicable by its
terms to "any child support payments" compels the conclusion that the statute does
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In many instances, despite Chevron's rhetoric, the Court seems fairly
undeferential. Although the Court talks about deference, it is quite willing to
reject administrative interpretations. Often the justices disagree about how
Chevron should be applied. A majority of justices may conclude that a statute
is plain, or that the agency's interpretation conflicts with the statute's structure
or legislative history, while other justices reach different conclusions. Of

course, the potential for disagreement is enhanced by the vagaries of the
interpretive process.
Thus, Chevron did not make agency interpretations "binding" or give
them the "force and effect of law." Indeed, one might argue about whether
courts ever really defer-in the sense that they accept an interpretation with
which they disagree. The justices themselves often contend that deference
principles are applied in a result-oriented manner. In Betts, the dissenters
argued:
The majority's derogation of this dual agency interpretation leaves one to
wonder why, when important civil rights laws are at issue, the Court fails
to adhere with consistency to its so often espoused policy of deferring to
expert agency judgment on ambiguous statutory questions ....

not apply to benefits paid to the dependent child of a disabled, retired, or deceased
parent for the express purpose of supporting that child. Because I am unpersuaded
that this crabbed interpretation of the statute is neither compelled by its language nor
consistent with its purpose, and arbitrarily deprives certain families of a modest but
urgently needed welfare benefit, I dissent.
Id. at 485-86.
In Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368 (1986), the Court
rejected the Federal Reserve Board's interpretation of the Bank Holding Company Act. The case
turned on the definition of a "demand deposit." The Board promulgated a rule under which it
provided that a demand deposit was one, "not that the depositor has a 'legal right to withdraw
on demand,' but a deposit that as a matter of practice is payable on demand."' Id. The Court
rejected this interpretation noting that "[t]he Board's definition of 'demand deposit,' therefore,
is not an accurate or reasonable interpretation of § 2(c)." Id. In the Court's extended analysis,
it noted that "the traditional deference courts pay to agency interpretations is not to be applied
to alter the clearly expressed intent of Congress." Id. The Court concluded that the agency had
acted contrary to that intent:
Application of this standard to the Board's interpretation of the "demand
deposit" element of § 2(c) does not require extended analysis. By the 1966
amendments to § 2(c), Congress expressly limited the Act to regulation of
institutions that accept deposits that "the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on
demand." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c). The Board would now define "legal right" as
meaning the same as "a matter of practice." But no amount of agency expertisehowever sound may be the result-can make the words "legal right" mean a right
to do something "as a matter of practice." A legal right to withdraw on demand
means just that: a right to withdraw deposits without prior notice or limitation.
Institutions offering NOW accounts do not give the depositor a legal right to
withdraw on demand; rather, the institution itself retains the ultimate legal right to
require advance notice of withdrawal. The Board's definition of "demand deposit,"
therefore, is not an accurate or reasonable interpretation of § 2(c).
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The majority today puts aside conventional tools of statutory
construction and, relying instead on artifice and invention, arrives at a
draconian interpretation of the ADEA which Congress most assuredly did
not contemplate, let alone share, in 1967, in 1978, or now ....
299
In Maislin,the dissenters argued that "[flour Courts of Appeals have expressly
invoked Chevron in the course of upholding the agency action challenged in
this case, but this Court does not deem Chevron ...

worthy of extended

3 '
discussion.""
The dissenters concluded by noting that "[t]he Court
dismisse[d] Chevron by means of a conclusory assertion that the agency's
interpretation [was] inconsistent with 'the statutory scheme as a whole.""'3 "
Whether Chevron is applied mechanically by the lower federal courts is
more debatable. Obviously, the Chevron decision, as it has been interpreted
and applied by the Supreme Court, does not preclude the lower courts from
exercising discretion. But whether the lower courts do, in fact, exercise that
discretion is another matter. In a recent study, Professors Peter Schuck and
Donald Elliott empirically analyzed post-Chevron lower court decisions. 3"
In this study, they sought to determine "how the Court's Chevron decision, as

clarified and reaffirmed eight months later in Chemical Manufacturers
Association v. NRDC, had affected appellate court review of agency
action. '30 3 Their conclusion, after examining numerous decisions, was that
the lower courts heeded Chevron's rhetoric: "We are reassured to learn from
our study that the Supreme Court's law does indeed matter to reviewing
courts, and that their law, in turn, matters to agencies." 3" However, they
found a significant statistical disparity between the D.C. Circuit and the other
circuits. The D.C. Circuit was decidedly less deferential than the other
circuits. 0 5

299. Public Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 193-94 (1989).
300. Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 152 (1990).
301. Id. at 116.
302. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 20.
303. Id. at 991.
304. Id. at 1061.
305. The study noted:
When we compare the D.C. Circuit's affirmance rate with the national circuit court
average in 1985, just after Chevron, we find that the Supreme Court's message did
not immediately induce greater deference by the D.C. Circuit. Between 1984 and
1985, while the national average affirmance rate rose from 70.9% to 81.3%, the
affirmance rate in the D.C. Circuit actually declinedfrom 58.6% to 52.6%. Further
analysis using ourresearch methodology could shed light on the particular techniques
that the D.C. Circuit used to buck the national post-Chevron trend of increasing
deference, although our dataset may be too small to permit drawing statistically
significant conclusions on this issue. In any event, by 1988 the gap between the
D.C. Circuit and the other circuit courts had narrowed (61.5% versus 75.5%). Still,
affirmance rates remained almost 15% lower in the D.C. Circuit than the average for
the other circuits.
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The results of this study are not surprising. Indeed, they confirm another
important fact: even before Chevron, the federal courts were "deferential" to
agency interpretations. The study notes that, in 1975, almost ten years before
Chevron was decided, all circuits (including the D.C. Circuit) were affirming

agency action about sixty percent of the time. There are good reasons.
Judges are busy people, and they are burdened by clogged dockets. Moreover,
judges can be intimidated by administrative cases which often involve highly
complex and specialized issues. Thus, even though most judges will find a
way to reject agency interpretations with which they are dissatisfied, they will
ordinarily defer.
In the pre-Chevronera, Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas alleged that
courts routinely defer to agency interpretations thereby making it difficult or
impossible to successfully challenge administrative action."c In his view,
deference principles forced citizens to "play with a deck [that was] legally
stacked" against them. 7 Because of his concerns about the deference rule,
Senator Bumpers promoted a legislative initiative designed to abolish the
deference rule but later modified to restrict the rule's application."' Most

306. The Senator argued:
There is a long-standing doctrine of administrative law that courts will defer
to the interpretation adopted by an agency of its governing statute. Although the
doctrine was well founded in its inception, in practice, at least in recent years, it has
led to courts virtually rubber-stamping every agency action that comes before them
for review. Chief Justice Marshall said that it is emphatically the province of the
judicial department to declare what the law is, and S. 2408 would simply amend the
Administrative Procedure Act to declare that principle unequivocally. The bill
provides that courts shall review de novo all questions of law that come before them
in suits to review agency action, and that rules and regulations issued by an agency
shall not be upheld unless the court is persuaded clearly and convincingly that the
rules are within the power that Congress intended the agency to exercise.
122 Cong. Rec. 22,012 (1976).
307. 125 Cong. Rec. 414 (1979). The Committee on the Judiciary, in a report on The
Regulatory Reform Act, agreed:
When a citizen challenges an agency's rule or order in the courts, the odds should
not be stacked against him by judicial presumptions in favor of the agency. The
judicially created doctrine of deference to agency interpretations of law, which some
courts have elevated to a virtual presumption of correctness, places the bureaucratic
thumb on the scales of justice, weighing them against the citizen. We intend this
amendment to reestablish an equal balance.
S. REP. No. 274, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 170 (1981).
308. The 1982 version ofthe Bumpers Amendment would have amended the Administrative
Procedure Act's judicial review provisions to read as follows:
(a) To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall independently decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of
agency action....
(c) In making determinations concerning statutory jurisdiction or authority
under subsection (a)(2)(C) of this section, the court shall require that action by the
agency is within the scope of the agency jurisdiction or authority on the basis of the
language of the statute or, in the event of ambiguity, other evidence of ascertainable
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legal commentators disagreed with Senator Bumpers, and argued that the
amendment should not be adopted.3" The Amendment did not pass.

There is, in fact, little need for the Bumpers' Amendment. The lower
courts never give unquestioning deference. On the contrary, they are
surprisingly creative about how they limit doctrines like Chevron. They use
all of the techniques employed by the Supreme Court, as well as some others
of their own invention. In some cases, courts have avoided Chevron by
holding that certain issues are committed to the courts because they involve
"'
"pure questions of statutory interpretation,"31 jurisdictional questions,31
1
2
or preemption questions.
Courts also refuse to defer on many other

legislative intent. In making determinations on other questions of law, the court
shall not accord any presumption in favor of or against agency action, but in
reaching its independent judgment concerning an agency's interpretation of a
statutory provision, the court shall give the agency interpretation such weight as its
wanants, taking into account the discretionary authority provided to the agency by
law.
S.1080, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
309. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury andthe Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REv.
1 (1983); James T. O'Reilly, Deference Makes a Difference: A Study oflmpacts ofthe Bumpers
JudicialReview Amendment, 49 U. CINN. L. REv. 739 (1980); Weaver, supra note 47, at 597600; David R.Woodward & Ronald M. Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 329 (1979).
310. In other cases, they hold that deference is onlyxequired when agencies are making
policy decisions and is not required when an agency decides a purely legal issue. See, e.g.,
American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1183 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ('This court
recently construed the Cardoza-Fonsecaopinionas teaching that 'courts need not defer to agency
opinions on 'pure questions' of interpretation."); International Union, United Auto., Aerospace
& Agric. Implement Workers Union of Am. v. Brock, 816 F.2d 761, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Veterans Admin. Med. Ctr. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 732 F.2d 1128, 1132 (2d Cir.
1984); March v. United States, 506 F.2d 1306, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (The court noted that
"administrative construction of the statutory language under scrutiny in no way drew upon the
experience or expertise of the Defense Department. The interpretive problem before the
Department was the meaning of statutory language pertinent to a matter completely outside its
field of specialty, but well within the area entrusted to the courts."); Tocci Corp. v. Yankee Bank
for Fin. & Sav., 690 F. Supp. 1127, 1130-31 (D. Mass. 1988) (the court refuses to defer noting
that the FDIC is acting as receiver and should not be allowed to adjudicate claims made against
it.); A.L. Labs, Inc. v. EPA, 674 F. Supp. 894, 899 (D.D.C. 1987) (where the court notes that,
on questions of law, "administrative judgment is subject to plenary review." The court also notes
that "[g]reater reliance on the EPA's understanding would be proper only if construction of the
statute depended on the agency's expertise.").
311. See, e.g., Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 883 F.2d
117, 122 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1079 (1990); New York Shipping Ass'n
v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 854 F.2d 1338, 1363 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1041 (1989); Kokechik Fishermen's Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 839 F.2d 795, 807 (D.C.

Cir. 1988) (Starr, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989).
312. Some courts have held that, if the question is whether federal law preempts state law,
no deference is due. See Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. ICC, 879 F.2d 917, 921 (D.C. Cir.
1989) ("We have recognized that the necessity and propriety of Chevron deference in contests
over preemption remain open questions, and we have no occasion to resolve them here. For on
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grounds: that interpretations conflict with the Constitution;3 3 that they are
incorrect; 314 that the governing statute is clear so that there is no need for

interpretation; 315 that the official who issued the interpretation is not one
entitled to deference;3 6 that the agency's interpretation conflicts with one
of the canons of construction; 3 7 that an interpretive question lies outside the

each of the two statutory provisions upon which the Commission relies, we find that it fails to
meet either set of standards."); Barrett v. Adams Fruit Co., 867 F.2d 1305, 1307 (lth Cir.
1989), affid, 494 U.S. 638 (1990); City of New York v. FCC, 814 F.2d 720, 726 (D.C. Cir.
1987), affd, 486 U.S. 57 (1988).
313. See, e.g., Keeffe v. Library of Congress, 777 F.2d 1573, 1579-82 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (A
Library of Congress employee was a delegate to the Democratic National Convention. Library
officials concluded that she had violated the Library's conflict of interest prohibitions and took
disciplinary action. The employee argued that the agency's disciplinary decision violated her
First Amendment right to freedom of speech, and that the policy was unconstitutionally vague.
The court reversed the disciplinary decisioni on vagueness grounds.); L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc.
v. Donovan, 685 F.2d 664, 674-77 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health
Rev. Comm'n, 513 F.2d 713, 716 (8th Cir. 1975) ("Moreover, we decline to adopt the
Secretary's interpretation of the regulation for reasons of due process. Where, as here, the
interpretation derives little support from the language of the regulation, it would be fundamentally unfair to impose upon an employer civil penalties for its violation."); see also United States
v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Fluor Constructors, Inc. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Rev. Comm'n, 861 F.2d 936, 941 (6th Cir. 1988).
314. See, e.g., Donovan v. Castle & Cooke Foods, 692 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1982).
315. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. United States, 855 F.2d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1988);
Drake v. Pierce, 698 F. Supp. 1523, 1530 (W.D. Wash. 1988) ("Given the plain meaning of the
statutory language, the structure of the NHA, and the legislative history, the court finds
Congress' intent clear and unambiguous with respect to the primacy of federal preferences in the
selection of each family-participant in the Certificate and Voucher Programs. Because the Court
finds Congress' intent easily ascertainable, the court cannot defer to the Secretary's interpretation
of the statute.").
316. See, e.g., Caiola v. Carroll, 851 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (court notes that
interpretation is not to be given "dispositive weight," but rather is to be accorded only a
"modicum of respect."); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO v. Federal Labor
Relations Auth., 840 F.2d 947, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (court noted that counsel's interpretation
"plainly lacks the credentials of a position that agency heads have staked out after adjudicative
or rulemaking procedures allowing a full vetting of alternatives"); Ames v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 F.2d 1174, 1177 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977) ("We cannot accept the
Commission's current litigating position as an 'interpretation' by the Commission, which the
dissenting opinion calls it."); see also Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 162
n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 9 (1987) ("There is some question, to begin with, whether
an interpretive theory put forth only by agency counsel in litigation, which explains agency

action that could be explained on different theories, constitutes an 'agency position' for purposes
of Chevron."). But see Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n of Pa., Inc, v. Sykes, 676 F. Supp.
597, 602-04 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (court forced to construe Department of Transportation regulations
relying on an amicus curiaebrief submitted by DOT and treating the brief as an administrative
interpretation and defers to it.).
317. See, e.g., United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 440-41 (1960).
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agency's authority;" 8 that the agency has taken inconsistent positions
regarding the meaning of regulatory provisions;319 that the a§ency should
have rendered its interpretation using legislative procedures;' 0 or that the
agency's interpretation is impermissibly retroactive.32' Thus, if Chevron
makes agency interpretations "binding" and gives them the "force and effect
of law," thereby creating a virtual "rubber stamp" for agency action, it is fairly
clear that judges often misplace the stamp. The recent study of lower courts
does not contradict this conclusion. It shows that, despite the tendency for
deference, the lower courts overturn agency action a significant percentage of
the time.322
In the final analysis, Chevron did not fundamentally reshape administra-

tive law. Some lower courts may have been intimidated by Chevron's

rhetoric, but those courts may gradually reassert themselves as they realize that
Chevron did not strip them of their interpretive powers. As the foregoing
discussion suggests, "[t]he judiciary ... [remains] the final authority on issues
318. See, e.g., Fort Knox Indep. Sch. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 875 F.2d 1179,
1180 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that "[i]t is clear that we. need not defer to the FLRA's
interpretations and legal conclusions in this case, because 'such deference only applies when the
FLRA interprets the FSLMRA.'" (quoting Fort Stewart Sch. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth.,
860 F.2d 396, 419 (11th Cir. 1988))); West Point Elementary Sch. Teachers Ass'n v. Federal
Labor Relations Auth., 855 F.2d 936, 940 (2d Cir. 1988); Department of the Treasury v. Federal
Labor Relations'Auth., 838 F.2d 1341, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Department of the Navy v.
Federal Labor Relations Auth., 836 F.2d 1409, 1410 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[A]n agency decision is
not entitled to such deference when it interprets another agency's statute."); American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 803 F.2d 737, 740 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Coming Glass Works v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1559, 1565 n.5 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (noting its obligation to defer to an agency's interpretation of its governing statute, but
concluded that "the Commission is not charged with administration of the patent statute."
Therefore, the court need not "defer to its interpretation of patent law.").
319. See, e.g., American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1181-82 (D.C. Cir.
1987). The court stated:
We observe at the outset of our inquiry that EPA's interpretation of the scope
of its authority under RCRA has been unclear and unsteady. As previously
recounted, EPA has shifted from its vague "sometimes discarded" approach of 1980
to a proposed exclusion from regulation of all materials used or reused as effective
substitutes for raw materials in 1983, and finally, to a very narrow exclusion of
essentially only materials processed within the meaning of the "closed loop"
exception under the final rule. We emphasize, therefore, that we are confronted with
neither a consistent nor a longstanding agency interpretation. Under settled doctrine,
"[a]n agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency's
earlier interpretation is 'entitled to considerably less deference' than a consistently
held agency view."
Id.
320. See, e.g., First Bancorp. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 728 F.2d 434
(10th Cir. 1984); Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008, 1009 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 999 (1982).
321. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bufco Corp., 899 F.2d 608, 611-12 (7th Cir. 1990); Quincy Oil,
Inc. v. Federal Energy Admin., 468 F. Supp. 383 (D. Mass. 1979).
322. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 20.
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of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which
are contrary
to clear congressional intent."3 "[D]eference is not abdica3 24
tion.

323. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
324. ArabianAm. Oil, 111 S. Ct. at 1237 (Scalia, J., concurring) (He would have applied
deference principles, but rejected the agency's interpretation because it was unreasonable.); see
also Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820, 831 (1992) ("Deference does not mean
acquiescence").
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